The Big Four Meet—*J. A. del Vayo*

THE Nation

March 10, 1951

Asia, America, & Peace

Undeclared War - - - - *Edgar Snow*

Japan Rearmed? - - *Robert P. Martin*

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Liberation by Death - *Freda Kirchwey*

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The Case of David Hawkins

BY CAREY McWILLIAMS

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

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

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THE Nation

AMERICA'S LEADING LIBERAL WEEKLY SINCE 1865

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The Shape of Things

THE MOST HOPEFUL DEVELOPMENT ON THE price front in the past two weeks has been a minor but significant victory won by the embattled housewives who by reducing meat purchases brought down prices at the butchers' counters by a few cents. We trust they will extend their operations, for the meat trade is not the only one susceptible to this kind of pressure. Swollen inventories bought on credit are to be found in many lines of business, while production for civilian consumption remains very high. Much of the talk of shortages therefore is unjustified, and if consumers would refuse to be scared by the "buy now" tactics many merchants are using they might stimulate a healthy move to liquidate stocks. Certainly consumers need to take what action they can in this direction, since it is clear they cannot expect very much help from the Office of Price Stabilization, which seems more ready to sanctify *faits accomplis* than to tackle the problem of rolling prices back. In the past week the OPS has authorized a 3½ per cent increase in car prices and has set a ceiling on raw cotton of 45.76 cents a pound, the highest quotation in the five weeks preceding January 25, and incidentally the highest price since Civil War days. The OPS has also issued an order intended to freeze retailers' margins at their present levels, which in most cases are higher than before Korea. This order seems unlikely to please either the merchants, who fear they will be "squeezed" as wholesale prices rise, or their customers, who, as the United Labor Policy Committee has pointed out, will be unable to discover whether prices charged conform to the regulation.

*

PRESIDENT TRUMAN HAS NOW EXPRESSED HIS unabated confidence in Charles E. Wilson's demonstrated incapacity to understand the human complexities of a democracy's mobilization. This was either double-talk or a compounding of the President's original blunder in turning over to Wilson greater powers than should be given to any appointed official. A man with less blind faith in techniques successful in corporation management would have avoided many of Wilson's mistakes. A more carefully selected person would have invited spokesmen of farm, labor, and consumer groups, to advise him, knowing that to place such men in his office was in effect to disarm them. The fundamental trouble, however, derives from Mr. Truman's grant to him, on demand, of blanket authority over production, manpower, stabilization, and transport. The control of these matters at the top level is the President's job, it cannot ever be abdicated. Charles E. Wilson is a corporation executive who rose from the ranks and learned how to produce and sell electrical equipment at a profit. But the mobilization of a free people is not a production problem; it is a political problem. It is a task for men skilled in human relationships and sensitive to social forces—in short for politicians. If Mr. Wilson has contempt for the politicians—a matter that is not yet clear—so much the worse for him and for the country. We have embarked on a program for making our democracy strong. Democracy can be strengthened by the way its mobilization is carried out as much by its production of war tools. It is strengthened by the constant, expanding use of our traditional political forms under the guidance of elected officials responsible to the people, not by subjection to an appointed czar. The burden is Mr. Truman's, and he must take it back on his shoulders.

*

PRESIDENT AURIOL WAS STILL TRYING HARD as the week began to patch together some kind of Cabinet so that the conference of the Big Four deputies in Paris need not carry on its deliberations in the absence of a French government. It was not surprising that Georges Bidault and Henri Queuille, the latter famous for his skill in "mending broken china," should have failed to assemble a team to fill the vacuum created by René Pleven's fall. President Auriol finally turned to Guy Mollet, secretary general of the Socialist Party, whose modest personality particularly fits him to preside over a government with the limited mission of remaining in power until the President of the Republic has paid his announced visit to Washington. Certainly it is unlikely, even if he manages to form a Cabinet, that M. Mollet will be able to iron out the differences which have developed over the electoral reform. At the bottom of the present crisis are the coming elections and at the bottom of the dispute about the electoral reform is the fear of all parties in the governing coalition of being overrun at the polls by the Gaullists or the Communists or both. Electoral reform in France now means just one thing: to find a way of preventing these two groups from winning the number of seats in the new Assembly to which their voting strength is likely to entitle them—a rather ironical aim for a parliamentary democracy. In

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Italy also the government is in difficulty, for one section of the Christian Democrats, of whom Prime Minister De Gasperi is the leader, is in open revolt against him. As can be seen, the political stabilization of Western Europe takes on different aspects when it is discussed in official speeches and when it is tested on the shaky ground of practical politics.

*

LA PRENSA OF BUENOS AIRES SUDDENLY became an international issue when a gang of thugs, unimpeded by the Argentine police, shot and killed one of its employees, wounded fourteen others, and created a street riot which brought the arrest of two foreign newspapermen, one of them an American, the correspondent of *Time*. Intervention by the United States and British embassies obtained a "pardon" for these men. Meanwhile protests against Dictator Perón's continuing attack on the great Argentine daily have poured into Buenos Aires from all parts of the continent. The staff of *The Nation* sent a cable to Señor Paz, publisher of *La Prensa*, assuring him of their "deepest sympathy and solidarity in his courageous fight to secure freedom of the press in the Western Hemisphere." It would be excellent if similar messages were sent by other publications and groups in this country interested in the defense of civil liberties. Irritated by the growing support that *La Prensa* is receiving from the most diverse elements in Argentine political and social life, Perón hesitates between completing the destruction of independent journalism and trying to discover some "honorable" compromise. If the volume of protest from this country reached dimensions appropriate to the issue it is possible that *La Prensa* would be allowed to renew publication. But action must be immediate.

London, March 1

THE request of the British Trade Union Congress that the government rescind the anti-strike enactments is an attempt to take the lid off labor discontent in order to prevent the mounting pressure from escaping through the spout of Communist-influenced wildcat strikes. Anger is mounting because living costs have already increased by approximately 15 per cent during the past year, according to university statisticians, while wages—largely tied to a somewhat unreal official cost-of-living index—have advanced only about 4 per cent. This trend will certainly continue, since British devaluation and the Korean war have increased the cost of imported foods and raw materials considerably more than the price of British manufacturers. On top of this come the burdens of rearmament. Chancellor of the Exchequer Hugh Gaitskell has been telling intimates that the new budget, due in April, will be "Draconian" and that rearmament will in effect have to be financed largely by depressing real wages. The Trade Union Congress resolution asks

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the government to help it keep real wages steady by making it easier to strike legally. It also asks higher taxes on profits.

Trade unionists fear that although Communist influence is at a record low in the movement, it may make a comeback via a wave of "illegal" strikes. The government's recent effort to curb Communist activity among the dockers by indicting a Communist for conspiracy has boomeranged and brought eight thousand London longshoremen out on strike in defense of the Communist right to agitate—this after the Communists had failed to pull the same men off their jobs for economic purposes. Britain's orthodox labor spokesmen see a need to reassert their leadership in order to retain the initiative in the long winter of conservative rule which they accept as inevitable. Labor can recover its popular support only by reversing the present inflation. It can do this only if the armament race is brought to halt. A. R.

OUR Paris correspondent writes: The event of the week was, of course, the death of André Gide. Frenchmen were surprised at the wailing abroad, especially in Britain, where the event was treated as if Gide had been a sort of French equivalent of G. B. S.—the Grand Old Man of French literature. To the young generation of French intellectuals and university students, Gide was, above all, the D. O. M.—the Dirty Old Man—of French literature. This was not because he had been for years the best alibi for every Gide-reading and non-Gide-reading homosexual, but because his precious "sincerity" and "intellectual integrity" had an exhibitionist and narcissistic quality that was odious to the entire generation, regardless of their politics.

Two years ago, when Gide was eighty, dozens of young French writers were asked by *Combat* what they felt and thought about Gide, and the replies expressed almost unanimous hostility. To them Gide was the personification of all that was rotten, anti-social, feebly contemplative, and, in the last analysis, cowardly, in the French character, a poisonous plant of the between-the-wars period. As was to be expected, he had been out of sympathy with the Resistance, and his "intellectual integrity" had led him, in 1941, to accept the Nazi occupation with placid cheerfulness as something that "might prove a good thing in the end"—so long as he could go on publishing odds and ends in collaborationist journals and playing Chopin undisturbed. The most vital elements in France had more respect for all-out Vichyites than for Gide, and they felt that when he got the Nobel Prize, France was slapped in the face.

In the obituaries tribute was paid to Gide as a stylist, but no French critic even remotely suggested that he was "France's greatest writer." As a man, he was most unlovable, with his monumental vanity and thin-lipped meanness. A. W.

Liberation by Death

BY FREDA KIRCHWEY

SOME day soon the American mind, mercurial and impulsive, tough and tender, is going to react against the horrors of mechanized warfare in Korea. It will take time. We were all hardened by the methods of mass-slaughter practiced first by the Germans and Japanese and then, in self-defense, adopted and developed to the pitch of perfection illustrated at Hiroshima and Nagasaki by the Western allies and, particularly, the Americans. We became accustomed to "area" bombing, "saturation" bombing, all the hideous forms of strategic air war aimed at wiping out not only military and industrial installations but whole populations. By the time the first atom bomb burst over Hiroshima it was possible to still the sharp voice of warning, and even the anxious whisper of conscience, by calculating the greater numbers that would have died if the bomb had not been dropped. The calculations, as it turned out, were probably wrong; but even if they were not, something else was. A deep scar was left on the mind of Western man, and, again, particularly on the American mind, by the repression of pity and the attempt to off-load all responsibility onto the enemy.

The damage remains. It accounts for the current matter-of-fact weighing of military advantage against possible kick-back in the future use of the atom bomb. It partly accounts for the fatalism with which so many Americans anticipate a general war which would, so certainly, destroy for all concerned all the objectives for which they pretended to fight. More immediately it explains the absence of protest against the orgy of agony and destruction now in progress in Korea. "They started it." Blame Moscow—or the Northern Koreans—or the Chinese Communists—or blame all three. Off-load the guilt.

But it cannot be done, if only because Americans are decent as well as hard-boiled, and subject to sudden revulsions of feelings that confound logicians. For while it is true that the aggression was begun by the Northern Koreans, and that the Chinese marched in when their border was approached, and that Russia may be behind it all, none of this excuses the terrible shambles created up and down the Korean peninsula by the American-led forces, by American planes raining down napalm and fire bombs, and by heavy land and naval artillery.

The facts are only beginning to be told in the United States press. I have written before about this, but it still remains a mystery why the British and French papers have so consistently told a franker and more detailed story of the destruction of Korea. The censorship, presumably, is the same, but American correspondents devote relatively little attention to civilian horrors that have

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been freely reported abroad. The suffering of civilian refugees has, it is true, been honestly described in our papers, and some figures as to over-all destruction have been published. Only the other day J. Donald Kingsley, United Nations agent general for Korean reconstruction, reported that Korea was the most devastated land and its people the most destitute in the history of modern warfare. He described the 3,500,000 refugees, lacking clothing and food as well as shelter, for whom no adequate provision can now be made. But figures do little to awaken the minds of war-hardened newspaper readers. They respond only when the human anguish behind the generalities is made concrete.

This has been done only a little and here and there. I have before me a handful of clippings of recent months. They make nasty reading, but few of them question the necessity for the vast slaughter of civilians, the burning of whole villages because a few Communist guerrillas were suspected to be hiding there, the systematic destruction of factories and water systems and transportation facilities—down, almost to the last ox-cart. And still fewer ask the further questions: What does this undifferentiated warfare, this blasting of an entire country, do to the idea of "collective security"? What does it do to the concept of "liberation"?

These questions are being asked in Europe and Asia. They are being asked also in Korea. One of the few plain-spoken accounts of the effect of American methods of warfare on the Korean people appeared in a dispatch by George Barrett in the New York *Times* last Saturday. This story deserves quotation:

> As Korean civilians return to the north now in the wake of the advancing forces of the United Nations and see what has happened in their villages, they stare in numb disbelief at the ghostly piles of ashes that were once homes, schools, and shops. With no homes left for them to put back their meager belongings . . . , many of them are losing all heart in the seesaw war and are asking bitterly just to be let alone to rebuild their bamboo and straw huts. . . .
>
> The danger to the good-will relationship between most Koreans and the United Nations is being heightened by a growing feeling among the Koreans that much of the destruction has been unnecessary. From the time that the allied armies began their withdrawal from Pyongyang, the Communist capital in the north, many units . . . have been leaving blackened paths of their own whenever they have been forced to withdraw along their sectors. . . .
>
> Generally a soldier on the alert in the fighting sector cannot hesitate to squeeze the trigger when there is a sudden movement beyond his position, and he cannot be blamed if the figure darting behind a distant barn turns out later to be a woman carrying her child. But there are cases of infantrymen, resting for a short break, putting matches to a straw hut to get warmth.

No one can read such a story without realizing that liberation through total destruction cannot be the answer to the world's dilemma. Korea, blotted out in the name of collective security, blames the people who drop the fire bombs, touch the match to the straw, blow up the precious industrial facilities. This may seem unfair to the military mind. But it is inevitable and perhaps not as unfair as it looks. For a force which subordinates everything to the job of killing the enemy becomes an enemy itself, no more tolerable to those who watch their country die under its attack. And after a while plain horror displaces a sense of righteousness even among the defenders of righteousness, and thus the cause itself becomes hateful. This has happened in Korea. Soon, as we learn the facts, it will overtake us here in America.

And in Europe and the rest of Asia? There people know the cost of a modern war of liberation. They know that the devastation of Korea has been limited by the fact that only one side possesses efficient machines of destruction and that the use of the atom bomb has been considered impractical. A global war fought with the weapons now available to both sides, not to mention those beginning to be poured out in an ever-mounting stream, would make Korea, by comparison, a summer-day picnic. Knowing this, Asians and Europeans hang on for their life to the possibility of continued negotiation between West and East and regard with dismay and fear political personages who substitute abuse and defiance for diplomacy or assume that attempts to reach a settlement—such as the four-power talks—are doomed in advance to failure.

The Two-Term Limit

IT TURNS out that the "do-nothing Eightieth Congress" did something after all—and did it to Harry S. Truman, of all people. It passed the Twenty-second Amendment to the Constitution, which has just been ratified by three-fourths of the state legislatures and become the law of the land. In an extraordinarily frank statement Guy Gabrielson, chairman of the Republican National Committee, has made perfectly plain the political purpose, as far as his party is concerned, of the amendment that limits future Presidents to two elected terms and no more than ten years in any case. Technically Mr. Truman is exempt from the provisions of the amendment, but, Mr. Gabrielson told the press, "if he should have the audacity to seek another term in 1952, I am confident that the voters—certainly in their present mood—will see to it that the spirit of the amendment is observed."

This ulterior consideration, and the even shabbier purpose of administering a posthumous rebuke to Franklin D. Roosevelt, tend to cloud the issue, but it would

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be grossly unfair to suggest that no issue exists or that the constitutional change has lacked the support of principled people whose motivations are of the highest. Their argument, basically, is the Jeffersonian fear that the power of a President can become self-perpetuating. Beyond this, they say, the bar to a third term may have one of two subsidiary effects on a second-term President, both politically healthful. Unaffected by further ambition, he will tend to govern with more detachment than might otherwise be the case, or he will give subordinates an opportunity to demonstrate their capacities, build them up, as it were, in a manner that Roosevelt conspicuously failed to do.

Respecting these arguments as theory, we feel, nevertheless, that they are not too substantial. What Jefferson feared was that the country might succumb to monarchy, that "perpetual eligibility of the President would make the office one for life first and then hereditary." But between the people of the United States and autocratic rule in this century are not the mechanics of election but the degree of vitality left in the Bill of Rights. As long as these rights remain in force—and among the supporters of the Twenty-second Amendment are some who would stifle them—we shall have no dictatorship, whatever a President's tenure of office; once they are gone, the whole Constitution will be meaningless, and such an amendment as this will be a ludicrously feeble reed for democrats to lean on.

If this were the only argument against the Twenty-second Amendment, the case would be wholly negative. More serious by far is the fact that the change weakens our democracy in principle and may prove positively harmful in practice. It prohibits the people from acting in what they may at a given time believe to be their best interests. Gabrielson and others have invoked "the time-honored tradition set by George Washington" on the subject, but nothing could be more palpably dishonest. Washington rejected a third term for himself, but not as a matter of principle. On the contrary, he had written while the government was being established: "I can see no propriety in precluding ourselves from the services of any man who in some great emergency shall be deemed universally most capable of serving the public." Only the public can decide when such a circumstance exists, and any absolute prohibition is an infringement of their sovereign right.

Clearly the public had this feeling in 1940. The third term was the key issue of the Republican campaign in that year, and it is a matter of record that many Democrats, as well as Republicans, were seriously disturbed by the prospect of having the tradition violated. Yet the people as a whole decided that the impending war crisis called for the trained hand of Roosevelt and that this need outweighed the general desirability of the two-term limit.

Against this clear plebiscite the champions of the new amendment pose the fact of its ratification and challenge the President to fly in the face of the national decision. In terms of democracy the two verdicts are not even comparable. Roosevelt won by a direct vote of the people. The amendment, on the other hand, glided through legislatures in a fog of silence—passed by men whose election in no way involved their stand on the question—without hearings, without publicity, without any of that popular participation that should have accompanied a change in the organic law of the country.

Representative Joseph W. Martin, Republican leader in the House, can call this a "victory for the people," but if it is a victory at all, it is for the Republican Party, which has perhaps succeeded in embarrassing Mr. Truman, and for some Southern Democrats who shared in that purpose. But even in these crass terms the triumph is a doubtful one. The day may conceivably come when a crisis calls for the third election of a Republican President, though this may be hard even for G. O. P. partisans to realize inasmuch as only three of their number ever won two terms and only one actually served out a full eight years. In a more immediate sense the victory will seem a hollow one to the Martins and Gabrielsons if by eliminating Truman it produces a fresh and vigorous Democratic nominee in 1952, unburdened by Truman's mistakes and more appealing than any of the Republican aspirants now in sight.

Labor and the Democrats

BY WILLARD SHELTON

Washington, March 2

PRESIDENT TRUMAN departed happily today for a vacation in Key West, leaving behind the revolt of union leaders against Mobilization Czar Charles E. Wilson—which suggests that he understands neither the motives of the union leaders nor the justice of their complaints. One is driven to speculate whether a chain of events has not been set in motion that will ruin the long and generally beneficial alliance between labor and the Democratic Party. No one on the White House staff at present appears capable of repairing the damage, as Clark Clifford did after the President, in May, 1946, in a moment of temper and bad judgment proposed a draft-strikers law of unprecedented severity.

It can be assumed that the Wage Stabilization Board will be "reconstituted" soon by Stabilization Director Eric Johnston and that the union spokesmen will return to it even if their fundamental quarrel with Wilson has not been settled. Johnston did not give labor everything it demanded when he attempted at the last moment to avert the union walkout, but he suggested—on his own initiative and without the formal approval of Wilson—

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basic changes in the abortive wage freeze worked out by the public and industry members of the original board. He acted on his own initiative again last night in ordering that cost-of-living escalator clauses in existing contracts should be honored even if their effect was to raise wages for particular groups of workers above the 10 per cent ceiling. Johnston understands the elementary fact that in a democracy the wages paid people working for private employers can be frozen only with their consent.

The union leaders are not incapable of sacrificing for the good of the country what they consider the valid interests and rights of union members—within tolerable limits and by mutual agreement. The editorial writers and Congressmen who roared imprecations at labor for "striking" against the government should refresh their memories of World War II. In 1941 union leaders quit a mediation board which denied workers a union shop and the right to strike for it, but they joined the War Labor Board, which then worked out a compromise formula providing for maintenance-of-membership clauses in contracts. The United Labor Policy Committee, in its statement assailing Wilson, deliberately left open a door through which Johnston could invite them back to a revamped wage board. Aware that the unions believed much of the trouble was caused by the ineptness of the public members, Johnston talked of bringing back William H. Davis, the patient, able chairman of the old War Labor Board, and former Senator Frank P. Graham, who was one of its members.

THE relationship between Wilson and Johnston is a fascinating question. When Johnston was made Stabilization Director, replacing Alan Valentine, it was announced that an executive order would outline his powers; the order has never been issued. Johnston was expected to be allotted space in the Executive Offices Building, across the street from the White House, where the powerful lieutenants directly under Mr. Truman are almost automatically housed. Instead, he and a small staff are located several blocks away in the Reconstruction Finance Corporation building. No one in either Wilson's or Johnston's office will discuss in any great detail Johnston's attempt to settle the wage dispute on his own authority. Both men are Republicans—it is difficult to find a Democrat in the mobilization machine—but Johnston urged many months ago that workers should be given greater responsibility in government, because the battle for the world is now being fought at the workers' level. That is language which Wilson has shown he does not understand.

The United Labor Policy Committee, in its running war with Wilson, has been careful to avoid direct attacks on Mr. Truman. Although James B. Carey, secretary of the C. I. O., publicly read in Boston a letter criticizing the President for turning over mobilization to a corporation and banking clique, the letter was never sent to the White House. The independent Brotherhood of Railway Trainmen, whose leaders were recently denounced by the President for acting like a bunch of Russians, regularly refers to his "subservience to big business," but A. F. of L. and C. I. O. spokesmen have been cautious about burning their bridges. The question is how long this can continue and whether the union leaders' assault on Wilson will not cause labor's rank and file to lose confidence in the Truman Administration.

How can union members trust Mr. Truman for a fair deal when their own press repeatedly charges him with having turned over supreme economic power to a coterie of Wilson men who treat labor with contempt? What will happen if Wilson's policies, rammed down labor's throat, result in wildcat strikes against an unrealistic wage freeze imposed while price control remains a joke? Wildcat strikes were checked in World War II by the union leaders themselves; but these men knew that they had fair representation in the mobilization and stabilization agencies.

Mr. Truman, in one of his heart-warming moments of utter sincerity, wistfully murmured yesterday that he wished he could return to the Senate, which he had left to get into "more trouble than any man in the world has ever gotten into." Increasingly one has the impression that he does not want to run for President in 1952. But labor's loss of confidence in the Democratic Party affects more than Mr. Truman's private fortunes. It raises the question whether organized labor in America, as in Britain during the past half-century, will feel driven by the hostility and lack of understanding in both traditional parties to seek its political salvation in a third party.

The Big Four Meet

BY J. ALVAREZ DEL VAYO

AFTER several months of exchanging notes, the Big Four are actually going to meet. It is true that their representatives in Paris are only laying the groundwork for a conference of the four Foreign Ministers, but after this first step has been taken it is hardly conceivable that anything will be allowed to block such a supremely important attempt to ease the international tension.

To understand the difficulties and the chances of success one must bear in mind the reactions of the powers to the series of events that have marked the conference's long period of gestation. There has been a perceptible change in the West's reception of Moscow's direct communications and also in its attitude toward such collateral manifestations of Russian views as the Soviet reply to the British note of February 17 regarding

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the treaty of friendship between the two countries and the *Pravda* interview with Stalin. Even when the Kremlin launched a violent attack on Prime Minister Attlee and the Labor government, the atmosphere in London and Paris remained favorable to negotiation.

Washington has been less enthusiastic. In his *Pravda* interview Stalin did not mention four-power talks or the German issue, but the question of course arose whether his remarks smoothed the way to a meeting or would effectively prevent one. Some French and British commentators heard in them, especially in his reference to the quality of the American soldier, "a tone of esteem and almost of friendship," as *L'Observateur* put it. Roger Massip, who is as moderate in his views as he is well-informed on foreign affairs, wrote in the conservative *Figaro* that it "would be a mistake to think Marshal Stalin wanted to torpedo the conference which Moscow, it should not be forgotten, had taken the initiative in proposing." On this side of the Atlantic, however, the interview was dismissed as "pure propaganda," likely to destroy any hope of successful negotiation.

No other reaction could have been expected. For years the American people have been told by their government and by their Russian experts, first, that it was impossible to talk with the Russians; second, that even if negotiations were undertaken no agreement could be reached; third, that no agreement would be worth anything, since the Russians would not respect it.

Ever since Acting Foreign Minister Gromyko handed his first request for a conference to the ambassadors of the United States, Great Britain, and France, the Russians have been accused of trying to sow disunity in the Western coalition—which would hardly be surprising inasmuch as the coalition is directed against Russia. But it often seems as if Moscow had only to wait and let the Western powers find their own grounds for disagreement. One has been provided by Adenauer's shrewd attempts to obtain assurances from the Allied High Commissioners in West Germany that the four-power conference would take no decisions inacceptable to Bonn; this would in effect fulfil Bernard Baruch's famous prophecy: "Germany will dictate the peace in Europe." The French High Commissioner, M. François-Poncet, refused; the British High Commissioner, Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick, consented but his government called him to order. Mr. McCloy amiably assured the Chancellor, according to the New York *Times*, that the "investment of their resources in Western Germany gives evidence of their [the Allies'] good faith that there would be no betrayal of the Germans."

Adenauer's maneuvering has now been checked by the increasing clamor for the unification of Germany, which has pushed all other problems into the background, even rearmament. Under the pressure of the demands for unity issuing constantly from the eastern zone, West Germany appears suddenly to have reached agreement on a policy toward the east and, according to a statement by Dr. Schumacher, the Social Democratic leader, at a press conference in Berlin on February 28, will "take the initiative in the campaign for German unity." Smart politician that he is, the Chancellor has climbed on the bandwagon and in a coming address to Parliament is expected to urge unification even more vigorously than Grötewohl himself, the Minister President of East Germany.

THE impatience with which the people of Europe await the four-power conference and their insistence that everything possible be done to make it a success have penetrated even to conservative American circles. *Business Week* of January 6 reported that "some American observers in Paris feel a refusal to talk with Moscow will now completely shake Western Europe's faith in American leadership." In the words of the *Wall Street Journal* of January 4, such a refusal would leave the United States "open to the charge that it is unwilling to negotiate with the Russians. This country should always be willing to talk as long as it is possible to talk."

The official American view remains skeptical. In announcing the American decision to take part in the preliminary Paris meeting, Michael J. McDermott, State Department press official, warned that the Soviet note "does not suggest any real change of attitude on their part which would encourage the hope that the four ministers would be able to reach useful agreements." To use the conference for propaganda is the purpose officially attributed to the Russians. But Stewart Alsop, writing from Washington in the New York *Herald Tribune* of March 2, revealed that what the government fears even more is that the Russians will come to Paris with very concrete proposals. "A nightmare," he wrote, "is beginning to haunt those principally responsible for American foreign policy. For it is now about as certain as such things can be that the Kremlin will soon formally propose a German settlement based on the unity of a 'neutralized' Germany, after the staggered withdrawal of all occupation troops." He even indicated that the Russians might "ostensibly accept the principle of a free, secret, unsupervised vote to elect a single all-German government." The thing most to be feared, apparently, is a reasonable Russia.

Except for the few remaining "merchants of death," even high finance in Western Europe is afraid of war. Its attitude was defined in the February issue of the liberal monthly *Esprit*: "At the time of Munich the financial élite feared a war [against Hitler] which it did not want; today it fears the consequences of a war of which it approves in principle . . . but which will destroy, equally, communism and capitalism." I know positively that in the critical weeks after the U. N. forces

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crossed the Thirty-eighth Parallel, when a general war with China, and perhaps with Russia, seemed imminent, some French multimillionaires turned their wealth into forms which could be readily taken out of France, bought houses in North Africa, and anchored their yachts in the harbor of St. Jean-de-Luz, ready to sail.

For the present the most important thing is the progress of the preparatory meeting in Paris. It is to be hoped that Great Britain and France can regain the initiative and exercise a moderating influence so that when the agenda for the main conference is decided on, Russia and the United States will not clash again. The thing to be avoided above all is having every Russian proposal countered by an American proposal, or the other way round, so that a deadlock becomes inevitable. For example, if the Americans demand that Russia induce the other countries of Eastern Europe to adjust the size of their armies in conformity with the peace treaties, Russia may demand the inspection of American atomic production, and then the old bitter controversy over atomic control will be revived, ruining any prospect of the conference's success. If Mr. Acheson tries to put Russia in the wrong by denouncing its violation of international agreements, Mr. Vishinsky will not lack the means of counter-attack. He might, for instance, introduce the Spanish issue, for the Western powers have violated the Potsdam declaration by their policy toward Franco. The sharp statement of the British Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Ernest Davies, against admitting Franco to the Atlantic coalition, which raised such a storm in Madrid, would indicate that if this controversial subject is put on the agenda by the Russians, it will not find the Western powers united.

The Russians must realize that the conference offers a unique opportunity to settle the differences between East and West without war. Its failure would give tremendous impetus to the accumulation of more and more atomic bombs, leaving it to them to finish the diplomatic dialogue. Russia can and should be intransigent on the question of German rearmament, but on other points it can and should yield, since the price of a limited agreement, which is all that can be expected in the present circumstances, can never be too high. A successful outcome of the conference will enable the forces of peace everywhere to keep the war hysteria under control for some time.

The New Phase—Undeclared War

BY EDGAR SNOW

WITH Mr. Truman's declaration of an American protectorate in Formosa and the use of American troops against Communists on the continent of Asia, the cold war merged into a state of undeclared war. The new phase is somewhat analogous to the 1931-39 period, when Japan seized Manchuria and North China, while Italy and Germany knocked off some victims in Africa and Europe, and Russia grabbed parts of Poland, Finland, and Rumania in the brief twilight before the Nazi invasion.

We can now observe some interesting things about this undeclared world war. Probably the most important fact is that Russia seeks to avoid involvement in a general catastrophe as long as possible. There is unanswerable proof of that. Because of fear of a head-on clash with the United States, Russia has refused to intervene with its armed forces in behalf of a Communist nation—North Korea—standing on a frontier of the utmost strategic importance. Second, it follows that at no time since 1945 has Russia intended to initiate a general war with the United States and its allies.

Third, having rejected the great "opportunity" of 1950, when the Red Army could have occupied all Europe, and moved down to the Persian Gulf, while Russia's Chinese allies were sweeping to Singapore and the Bay of Bengal, it is entirely unlikely that the Kremlin will launch a major war under the less favorable circumstances of 1951. Fourth, large-scale militarization of the anti-Communist bloc is nevertheless proceeding rapidly, on the assumption that just such a Russian attack is imminent.

Fifth, this all-out rearmament in the United States and Western Europe raises before Russian eyes the old frightful specter of massive "encirclement," of such a nature as to threaten its great industrial and military bases with obliteration by surprise attack. Russia has forgotten nothing it learned from Hitler's invasion and cannot for a moment trust assurances of peaceful intentions. Sixth, Russia must therefore quickly find an answer to this deadly peril, in addition to heavier armament—and short of general war.

The announced aim of the Allied strategy of building up "positions of strength" around Russia is to change the existing balance of power. It is intended to eliminate even the temptation, which the West's present lack of mili-

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tary power presents, for Russia to overrun the non-Communist countries by force. To do this, superiority in arms must be attained. And there is no doubt that if the war potential of the United States and Western Europe is mobilized, Russia and its friends can be "outarmed." It is known, however, that not the present 40 billion dollars, or double that, but from 120 to 150 billion dollars, of current value, will be the annual American military investment required to surpass, decisively, the war-production potential of the Eurasian Communist axis.

What is expected to happen when that has been attained? None of the Atlantic allies has ever explained, beyond the vague promise that communism would then be "contained." But it is hardly conceivable that such gigantic military burdens will be tolerated indefinitely, or even for a few years, by the American and Western European peoples for purely passive or defensive slogans. A seventh feature of the age, therefore, is that we must expect a "dynamic" ideology to be found to justify this costly activity—one with positive political aims which promise to eradicate for all time the basic conditions requiring the sacrifice of so many vital human needs.

Congress is already groping in this direction. It is clearly disposed to extend American anti-Communist intervention in Asia. It is ready to begin by rearming Chiang Kai-shek and helping him to invade China—a quixotic project, incidentally, which Mao Tse-tung would doubtless welcome as a new source of arms. Anyway, MacArthur has made it clear that he is ready to support Chiang's "liberation" effort by bombing Manchurian industry. Allied intelligence agencies have long been agitating for serious arming of anti-Communist underground movements in the Balkans and Russia. Thus the "positive political aims" of the mobilization may soon be openly defined as the liberations of *all* countries under the Kremlin's yoke—including, eventually, Russia itself.

If such developments by now seem logical enough for us to anticipate, it is likely that in Moscow they have long since been taken as much for granted as the "inevitability" of American rearmament. As for its own major contributions to that "inevitability," the Kremlin is probably blind to and unaware of them. But we may be sure of one thing, on the basis of past Communist "formulations" and of the facts now in being—that the Russian leaders will not sit idly by until new "positions of strength" embolden the Allies to announce more far-reaching and aggressive political aims.

Russia may now resort to greatly intensified promotion of civil war and revolution, without directly engaging Soviet forces. In this effort Communist China has emerged as an invaluable instrument, on a quite different level from the Soviet satellites in Europe. For events in Korea have made it clear that a kind of relationship new to the history of Stalinism now exists between Moscow and Peking. In China, unlike Eastern Europe, the apparatus of direct Kremlin control could not, in the nature of things, be established—even if Russia were inclined to assume economic responsibility for 400,000,000 people with a standard of living much lower than its own. Because Stalin did not have direct police power in China he had to recognize the Chinese Communist Party's independence in reality as well as in form and to rely upon Soviet moral, political, and economic prestige to retain the loyal support of the Chinese party. In this he seems to have been rewarded beyond his own reasonable dreams.

The first duty of Communists, in all times and places, is to pursue policies which enhance the security and power of the Soviet Union. In Korea it was demonstrated that the Kremlin could depend upon the Chinese party to live up to that obligation—all the more so because Chinese leaders now see no impressive contradictions between the Kremlin's purposes and their own. And this fact—the reverse of the notion that China is an unwilling slave of Russia—is the eighth important feature of the new undeclared world war. It is quite enough to give the Kremlin an enormously expanded field of maneuver.

While Russia cautiously avoids direct war with the United States or its allies, it has the means of embroiling them in a dozen widely scattered areas. China is the key to such a strategy in the East; Germany, in the West. Korea was a grave disappointment to Communists who expected a pushover victory, but it showed the Kremlin how costly a task suppressing Communists abroad can be made for the United States.

BARRING a settlement by compromise, there is no visible prospect of a lasting decision in Korea for months or perhaps years. Even if the Chinese were driven out, or voluntarily withdrew, leaving the main towns, roads, and railways in Allied hands, a second "people's war" would probably begin before the ruins could cool. The minimum objectives of Chinese intervention certainly include organizing guerrilla bases and training and arming the Korean peasantry on a mass scale for prolonged partisan warfare. There is little reason to suppose that any Syngman Rhee regime would be able to survive against native Communist opposition if American police power were withdrawn.

In addition to Formosa, General Wu Hsiu-chan, Peking's spokesman at Lake Success, mentioned the Philippines and Indo-China as countries to which China would extend a "brotherly hand" in the struggle for "liberation." If he did not include Hongkong it was purely for tactical reasons. The same doubtless applies to Burma, Malaya, Siam, Indonesia, and perhaps even India. In all these places civil war, or national revolution combined with civil war, either already rages or could be promoted with Chinese Communist help.

Right now Indo-China, on the periphery of the Soviet

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empire, is the most vulnerable objective in the Communist conception of protracted class wars of attrition fought by armed peasant masses. With only negligible aid from China, Ho Chi Minh's forces are able to confine the French to a few cities and strong points. France's five-year attempt to reconquer the colony has already cost it roughly the equivalent of all the Marshall Plan aid it has received. Yet the Vietnam revolutionary army is now a more formidable military-political problem than the Chinese Soviet republic of Kiangsi presented to Chiang Kai-shek. It took the Generalissimo five years, and five major campaigns—the last involving the use of 900,000 troops at the peak of Kuomintang morale—to drive the Chinese red army out of Kiangsi by a strategy of encirclement and depopulation of the infected districts. Even so, his victory proved to be a Pyrrhic one.

If the Chinese gave Ho Chi Minh major help, including tanks and artillery, he would doubtless be able to push the French army of 150,000 men down to Saigon and perhaps into the sea. But the United States is now committed to intervention in Indo-China, too. Here an army of occupation even larger than that engaged in Korea may be needed, ultimately, to cope with a throng of guerrillas secure among a people almost undivided in its demand for complete independence. Moreover, American intervention in behalf of French colonial power and a monarch most Asian nations regard as a puppet would probably get no sanction in the U. N. Even Britain could take part only at the risk of provoking immediate retaliation in Hongkong.

The Hongkong-Kowloon colony might be held against direct assault, but the Chinese could make its defense extremely costly. The population is almost entirely Chinese. Very likely the Communists would not make an overt move there until a powerful underground movement had been organized and armed, reinforced by secret infiltration of regular troops. With control of the sea and air, 50,000 Anglo-American troops could perhaps retain the main island. But it would be a heavy economic liability, a fortress cut off from the continent and from the trade which was its life blood, and entirely dependent on American supplies.

In Burma civil war has been going on for four years, led by native Communists who regard Mao Tse-tung as their mentor. A major rebellion of the Shan people in the north could probably be instigated by Chinese promises of independence, and armed help. With Chinese backing the Burmese red army could doubtless overthrow the weak government at Rangoon, unless that government got support from Allied armies. Another 75,000 foreign troops might be needed to reconquer and pacify Burma—and several billion dollars in aid to rebuild it at the end of a protracted partisan war.

Similar possibilities may tempt Peking in Thailand and Malaya, where large indigenous Chinese populations, predominantly working class, almost outnumber the natives. The Burmese, Thai, Cambodian, Vietnamese, Malayan, Japanese, Indonesian, and Filipino Communist parties are all represented in China by military and political delegations and liaison officers. Though China could not supply all their needs as insurgents without Russian help, Moscow may provide more abundant aid as it seeks to divert the Western power now being mobilized against it. Respectable quantities of arms have already been smuggled to the Hukbalahaps in thé Philippines.

Conceivably, by exploiting all the political-military opportunities in Southeast Asia and in Korea and Japan, the Chinese might tie down half a million Allied troops. Of course there would soon be a hue and cry to carry the undeclared war directly to China. That must certainly be included in the calculations of Moscow and Peking. While not welcoming the risk, it seems likely that the Chinese Communists loyally reconciled themselves to it before they intervened in Korea. Though China might suffer terrible wounds from an invasion or an air war, two million American troops would be required to hold just the main cities and communications. That would mean a tremendous diversion of strength from the chief objective, Russia, the "center of the world revolution."

THE Kremlin's maneuvering ground for undeclared war in Europe is narrower but still impressive. Russia could withdraw its own troops from Germany and retain only police power there. A civil war could break out in West Germany and receive support from East German "volunteers"; this would impose heavy military exertions on the Allies. A similar situation might be created by armed uprising in Yugoslavia—with the Balkan Communists offering "volunteer" support to the insurgents.

In Iran the Russians have in the Kurds a people capable of launching a war of "liberation" against the effete Shah and the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. Given sufficient across-the-border help, a Kurdish rebellion, in alliance with the followers of the old Tudeh Party, might readily win victory, without direct Soviet involvement. Again, suppression could mean the diversion of a hundred thousand Allied troops, who might be lucky to arrive in time to save the oil wells.

Now until all these and still other political and military means of "exploiting the contradictions within the enemy camp" have been exhausted, the Red Army, unless the U. S. S. R. is itself invaded, is not likely to commit its troops in direct intervention anywhere. Russia needs much more time, preferably another ten years, before it can risk any general offensive. As the momentum of Western rearmament grows, the Kremlin may try to buy time by offering plausible peace proposals, covering the questions of land, air, and sea parity, atomic

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weapons, Germany and Japan, and even withdrawal of armed forces from Eastern Europe. Meanwhile the Politburo probably hopes that in every country in which America intervenes it will continue to support the status quo and combat social-revolutionary movements, that such countries will become, like Korea, economic, political, and military liabilities in any scheme of grand encirclement or ultimate attempt to demolish the "center of the world revolution."

Such are the things which Stalin no doubt had in mind when, in his recent "interview" with *Pravda,* he promised the American "interventionists" "ultimate defeat" if they did not now accept the Chinese terms for a settlement in Korea.

British Thoughts on War

BY ALEXANDER WERTH

London, February 16

GEOGRAPHICALLY, economically, and psychologically Britain lends itself far less easily than France to any kind of "neutralism." For better or worse, England is destined to be an outpost of "English-speaking" defense. But the very fact that it is America's "unsinkable aircraft carrier" and therefore the most obvious target for either Russian attack or Russian retaliation has made public opinion here extremely distrustful of the more hotheaded elements in the United States. A phrase one hears constantly in conversations with people in every walk of life is: "if only the Yanks don't drag us into it." This sentiment, incidentally, is scarcely reflected at all in the daily press, whose pro-American conformism is the joint creation of the newspaper proprietors and the Foreign Office. In November, at the height of MacArthur's "Home by Christmas" offensive, the most pro-American papers showed some alarm, but it was only a pale shadow of the feeling sweeping the country, a feeling which was also evident in Parliament and which in the end compelled Mr. Attlee to fly to Washington.

The sense of disquiet, though less intense now, is nevertheless ever present, and is likely to continue as long as any kind of war goes on in the Far East. The "Peace with China" movement, which has developed in Britain with great speed, despite a total lack of encouragement from either the government or the press, is an expression of the profound British desire to warn America against committing Britain to war against its wishes. The movement was started by an *ad hoc* group under the wing of the National Peace Council, a non-party organization of long standing which originally showed "pacifist" tendencies. The "Peace with China" group is not itself pacifist, though no doubt it appeals to some old-fashioned pacifist elements. Its aim is to coordinate the efforts of all those who seek a constructive British initiative for peace. Broadly speaking, it follows the Nehru line on Asian questions, and is essentially non-Communist, non-pacifist, and not even "neutralist."

The Kingsway Hall meeting at which the National Council for Peace with China was created, though ignored and boycotted by almost the entire press, had an immediate and nation-wide response. Local "Peace with China" councils began to spring up all over the country; there are already thirty in the London area. Others are in Glasgow, Birmingham, Bristol, Hull, Newcastle, Hastings, Wolverhampton, Nottingham, Boulton, and Warrington. In Birmingham all the local Labor M. P.'s have joined. Among the members of the National Council are Lord Boyd Orr, Lord Lindsay, Lady Selwyn Clarke, Professor Blackett, Mrs. Harold Laski, Lady Parmoor, more than twenty Labor M. P.'s, including Elwyn Jones, Seymour Cocks, and Tom Driberg, and prominent Liberals like Wilfred Roberts, M. P., and Sir Richard Acland. Numerous Conservatives also promote the council's policy.

In its manifesto, "The Peril of World War," the council set down its principal objectives:

> We should emphasize our conviction that the Cairo and Potsdam decisions on Formosa are binding on the signatories.
>
> We should, in concert with the Commonwealth and other members of U. N., press for the admission of China to the Security Council.
>
> We should explictly oppose any extension of the Korean conflict.
>
> We should seek an early and equitable settlement in Korea . . . and make proposals for the creation of a united independent Korea.
>
> We should press for the fullest collaboration with India, Pakistan, and other Asian countries in a renewed effort by the U. N. peaceably to solve outstanding political problems and to consider comprehensive means for the economic rehabilitation of Korea.

The huge meeting in Glasgow on February 9, which almost entirely filled the city's largest hall, St. Andrew's, showed what a strong intellectual and emotional appeal the movement is making. Kingsley Martin, editor of the *New Statesman and Nation,* its real intellectual leader, made a deep impression on the audience by saying that the application of military sanctions to China would inevitably bring the Soviet air force into the war and, most

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likely, extend the war to Europe and to the British Isles. He strongly emphasized the point that the Peace with China Council was not anti-American, and that it was expressing the innermost thoughts not only of millions of Britons but also of millions of Americans whose opinions were never voiced in a conformist press and radio. In England, he said, most of the press was still misrepresenting the war in Korea as a police action in defense of collective security and democracy. He defended China's intervention in Korea on the ground that it had every reason to suspect MacArthur and other American leaders of the most sinister designs. MacArthur, with his avowed desire to "free" Asia, was the champion of colonialism and the oppression of the peoples of Asia. British audiences, with a bad conscience about Britain's own record in the past, are deeply sensitive to such arguments. There is a genuine feeling of friendship for China, and if Soviet communism is sufficiently disliked not to make Mao Tse-tung a hero, the revulsion against Chiang Kai-shek and Syngman Rhee is intense.

The audience at the Glasgow meeting was a typically mixed one. It contained a high proportion of working-class people but also many teachers, clergymen, business men, and others. There were a good number of "Z" reservists, for whom the danger of war is a matter of immediate personal interest. While the movement is ignored by the Communist Party, it may well include among its supporters some diehard pacifists and some emotional and intellectual anti-Americans, but in general, it is a crystallization of a deep-seated feeling against war and of the current discontent with the sometimes unduly timid policy of the British government in its dealings with America.

Because the council has been "tactless" in denouncing the American extremists, it has been frowned upon not only by the Foreign Office but also by Mr. Attlee; Transport House (the Labor Party headquarters), while not *forbidding* Labor members to speak at its meetings, has decided not to *encourage* them. But perhaps at heart Mr. Attlee knows that the movement is being duly noticed by Washington and is serving a useful purpose. If Sir Gladwyn Jebb has been doing his best to restrain the American generals in his tactful diplomatic way, the Peace with China Council, often in tactless and undiplomatic language, is telling America that the British public stands behind him.

Japan Rearmed?

BY ROBERT P. MARTIN

Tokyo, February 15

IN JAPAN it is considered ironical that 1951 is the Year of the Rabbit. According to the zodiacal calendar, the Year of the Rabbit should be a year of peace and successful accomplishment. Instead, to many Japanese 1951 promises continued fear and uncertainty, with the obstacles to peace and comfort seemingly insurmountable. The Japanese are being told by Americans and their own leaders that they may have to take up arms again, although five years of peace have not erased either the fear of war and devastation from the air or the secret dread that Japan may go back to being a nation ruled by militarists.

The following incidents may be taken as typical:

In A-bombed Hiroshima a Socialist candidate for mayor won election with the argument: "If you are willing to sign a pledge that you will gladly pay five to ten times the taxes you are already paying and that you are ready to be drafted into military service, then vote for my opponent, the man chosen by the Liberals [Premier Yoshida's party], who are plotting to involve the nation in rearmament and war."

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In the debate on whether Japan should rephrase the "no war" clauses of the constitution, a statement made by General MacArthur a year ago is often quoted: "Japan should be the Switzerland of the Far East and neutral for the same reason that Switzerland is neutral: no matter which side she might join she would inevitably be destroyed."

A famous Japanese general, still bitter over MacArthur's purge of regular officers, "almost as if they were criminals," declared: "We are not so simple and forgetful as to join the new army, which is going to be set up mostly for America's needs."

Many Americans, fearful that a rearmed Japan might turn into a Frankenstein monster, find small comfort in the bland assurance that United States control of Japanese imports and Japan's dependence on United States financial aid will be enough to prevent any resurgence of militarism. They remember that Premier Yoshida told a prominent diplomat he was "frightened at the prospect of reviving the army because the militarists might stage a coup d'état to seize power."

The inevitability of rearmament is generally accepted. The question is no longer whether Japan will be permitted to rearm, but when, how fast, and to what extent. Communist aggression in Korea and even more

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Communist China's subsequent intervention profoundly impressed those Japanese who had fondly imagined that their country could become Asia's "Switzerland." They began to realize that neutrality would not protect them and that the United States would not guarantee their safety from aggression unless they carried a share of the defense load. A major reason for the widespread passivity about rearmament is that no political group, other than the Communists and the left-wing Socialists, has taken a position against it. The Communists have been more or less driven underground, and the split in the Socialist Party decreases the effectiveness of the left wing's demand for a general peace, permanent neutrality, and no American bases. Non-Communist labor unions, however, still say Japan must remain neutral and disarmed in a world preparing for war. And many of Japan's intellectuals, while admitting that rearming is the best way to ward off aggression at the moment, are disturbed by the long-range implications of rearmament and alliance with the United States. The Peace Study Group, an association of prominent educators and intellectuals, has warned of the danger that Japan will remain a permanent "ward" of the United States and on semi-war terms with China and Russia.

When John Foster Dulles visited Japan, he frankly confessed that the United States had only a temporary interest in Japan. When industrialists questioned him about Japan's future prospects, he replied: "If the country is destroyed in five years, what does it matter what happens ten years from now?"

FOUR assets commend Japan to Americans who think in terms of global strategy. First, in a revolutionary Asia, Japan is one of the few countries in which order rather than chaos appears to be the natural state of affairs. Second, Japan is close enough to the centers of Communist power on the Asiatic mainland to have strategic value for the United States in a war fought with air power and atomic bombs; it is also big enough to be difficult to invade. Third, in Japan's vast population of more than 84,000,000 are experienced hands for factories and sturdy peasants with a century-old tradition of military service. And finally, Japan alone of all the Asiatic nations has the industrial capacity to support a large land army.

There are nearly 5,000,000 veterans of World War II in Japan, many of them still in their twenties. Each year between 800,000 and 1,000,000 youths come on the employment market and, theoretically, are available for military service. Japan's problem obviously is not man-power but a continuous supply of the weapons, ammunition, and equipment that a modern army consumes in prodigious quantities.

In a rearmament program Japan would be starting from scratch. The huge stores of arms and equipment surrendered after V-J Day were burned or dumped in the sea. Arsenals were destroyed or converted to peace-time use. The basic needs of a Japanese army, therefore, must at first be supplied by America. A long-range rearmament program, however, must depend on domestic production, on partial conversion of peace-time industries to war purposes. Far more than retooling and expansion of industry will be required. Rearmament, even on a small scale, will affect the country's still shaky financial structure, undermine the delicate balance between export and import trade, and probably prevent the extensive trade with Communist China that Japan has hoped would bring economic stability.

Japan has a large industrial potential. Steel production, now at an annual rate of three million tons, could probably be increased to five or six million tons. Plants manufacturing automobiles, locomotives, communications and electrical equipment, and machinery are not running at full capacity. A number of former ordnance and tank factories are reconditioning American equipment and vehicles needed for the war in Korea. Within a few months many large former war plants could be producing artillery, shells, tanks, and other matériel.

But Japan has two weaknesses: it is a have-not nation in terms of raw materials; and its normal source of supply is Communist China. Its steel industry was developed with materials obtained from the exploitation of Manchuria and China. This dependence on mainland sources still exists. The Japanese had planned to import this year more than a million tons of coking coal from North China's Kailan mines and between two and three million tons of iron ore from Hainan and central China —that is, more than 50 per cent of the raw materials required to produce four million tons of finished steel. The United States is a substitute source for coking coal, but the cost is considerably higher.

It is doubtful whether the United States, now engaged on its own rearmament and committed to massive support of the North Atlantic powers, has a sufficient surplus of basic raw materials to make large amounts available to Japan. During the 1951 fiscal year Japan needed 3,236,000 tons of food but by the end of the first half (December) had been able to get only 928,000 tons, or 28.7 per cent of its needs. It obtained only 8 per cent of its industrial-salt and 26 per cent of its coking-coal requirements during the same period. Meanwhile prices in the world market have risen, drastically affecting import plans. Wool prices, for instance, have nearly trebled in the last six months.

Many American and Japanese economists believe that Japan's recovery is too shallow to support any large rearmament program. The living standard of the people is still between 20 and 30 per cent lower than it was before the war. Diversion of production to armaments would reduce exports, force the government to increase

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taxes, and in the end lower the living standard. That would be dangerous from the political and social point of view. Most Japanese economists insist that a reasonable living standard can be maintained only through extensive trade with China. This trade was on the increase, reaching $10,000,000 a month despite handicaps imposed by both the Americans and Chinese, until the United States declared a flat embargo on trade with the Peking government. Certainly the Chinese Communists would not trade with Japan, even if Washington permitted it, if their coking coal and iron ore were to be used for the manufacture of arms. In the absence of this trade the United States must not only supply equipment and raw materials during the early stages of rearmament but continue to do so on an increasing scale.

ONE of Japan's leading economists has given me the outline of a plan by which his country, with American aid, could rearm to a limited extent. He assumed an army of 500,000 men, costing about 300 billion yen a year. This would be nearly half of the present national budget of 650 billion yen and approximately 10 per cent of the national income. The cost of an enlarged naval force, or coast guard, which Japan would need to control illegal trade and entry, was not considered. A volunteer army would be more expensive than a conscript army because good pay would be the major attraction.

This economist believes Japan can afford the 300 billion yen under certain circumstances. The government, for instance, now spends about 100 billion yen a year for occupation costs. The United States supplies about $200,000,000 a year (72 billion yen) in aid to Japan, primarily wheat, cotton, and other raw materials. If Japan were not required to bear the costs of the occupation and if the United States provided arms and equipment for the new army and continued its aid on the present scale for at least three more years, Japan might be in a position to assume the burden of supporting the army.

The core of a new Japanese army would be found in the 75,000-man National Police Reserve that General MacArthur authorized last summer when he began stripping the country of occupation troops for the war in Korea. MacArthur's directive said that the establishment of this force was a step in "the progressive development of law-enforcing agencies adequate to the maintenance of internal security and order." The N. P. R. can in fact develop in one of two directions—as a law-enforcing police body or as the cadre for a larger defensive army.

Creation of the National Police Reserve and the subsequent training program brought a rash of rumors which revealed the widespread anxiety over the prospect of rearmament. A census official was reported to have declined to accept a preliminary summary of the size of the population because it did not include the census of the new police force. This official, according to the popular version of the story, said the N. P. R. contained 75,000 men plus *x*, and since *x* was an unknown quantity he could not certify the accuracy of the population count. One definitely false rumor was that the N. P. R. was being trained in the use of tanks, bazookas, mortars, and heavy weapons. Another that caused quite a stir was that trainees received basic instructions in English. This was cited as proof that American officers would some day be in command of Japanese soldiers. At first the recruits did march singing "one, two, three, four," but they soon reverted to "ichi, ni, san, shi." Although American carbines and field manuals are used, American officers and enlisted men act only as supervisors; the Japanese are in charge of training.

Nearly half of the reservists are veterans; six thousand are former officers. No difficulty was encountered in recruiting the number desired. The minimum pay for an unmarried regular policeman is 3,991 yen (about $11) a month, whereas his equivalent in the N. P. R. is paid 4,500 yen a month and is fed and housed. At the end of the two-year enlistment each non-commissioned reservist is given 60,000 yen cash as a retirement bonus. In the rush to enlist some of the most eager, to show their "sincerity," wrote their applications in blood: one was reminded of the "kamikaze" philosophy of World War II.

For months after the creation of the N. P. R., MacArthur's subordinates heatedly denied that it would ever become the nucleus of a new army. Now, with SCAP admitting that Japan may need an army to oppose aggression, they say, in substance, that "Japan has the right to defend itself." Thousands of experienced ex-officers are available for the new army if and when it comes into being. MacArthur has already exempted 3,200 from the purge, and theoretically they are now free to join any police or future military establishment. MacArthur's intelligence chief, Major General Charles A. Willoughby, has a complete file giving the experience, capabilities, and whereabouts of all demobilized Japanese officers. He also keeps on his pay roll, in the historical section of G-2, a group of former colonels who were the "brains" of the planning and operations sections of the Imperial General Staff. If these men are "de-purged," as seems likely to happen after a peace treaty is signed, they will provide a ready-made staff.

Mr. Dulles said the word "rearmament" was not mentioned in any of his official talks here. He did, however, tell a number of Japanese leaders that they could never again have a "national" army. The Japanese got the impression that any military force they organized in the future would be part of a United Nations force. But they also believe that once a peace treaty is signed and Japan regains its sovereignty, they will be more or less free to determine how far and how fast their rearmament shall go.

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DANGEROUS THOUGHTS

"A Guy's Gotta Be Dead"

THE Columbia Broadcasting System, which is great for minding other people's business, approves of freedom of the press. It took this firm, forthright position by putting on the air in January a dramatization of the trial of John Peter Zenger. But John Peter Zenger is long dead. On a more immediate question—that of the right of CBS employees to hold private opinions—this great network is less approving. Its employees, including those who worked on the Zenger broadcast, have had orders to fill out and sign a loyalty questionnaire or take the consequences.

Even the lowest echelon of network vice-presidents knows that all radio and television material is carefully screened before it is let loose on the public air. Contamination of public morals is impossible. But egged on by the pressure groups before which it has always shaken like jelly, CBS decided screening of content was not enough. It took as its excuse the national emergency, talked about sabotage and subversion, about making safe the vital communications industry. CBS sent the questionnaire, a replica of that used by governmental civil-service agencies, to its entire staff, 2,500 in all from coast to coast.

The Hearst press was enthusiastic. The Scripps-Howard press was enthusiastic. *Counterattack* applauded. And by the purest coincidence William S. Paley, chairman of the board of CBS, got a government job for which he had long been angling.

The victims were not so enthusiastic. Many of them grabbed a more primitive means of communication and called their unions. The Radio Writers' Guild, the Authors' League, and the Radio and Television Directors' Guild protested vehemently. On the sacrosanct twentieth floor at CBS, where sit the top brass in air-conditioned offices (they screen what they breathe, too), the unions met with CBS. So far no union member has been fired.

But at least one individual has not been so lucky. In January a twenty-two-year-old stenographer named Joan Clapp had scruples about signing. She was called up to the twentieth floor and asked why. She was not a Communist; she had never belonged to any organizations on the Attorney General's list; she was non-union—in fact, she was nothing, so why?

Miss Clapp's sole reason, as given in a newspaper report, was that she didn't consider her personal affairs any of CBS's business. Miss Clapp was fired. A Mr. Joseph Ream, executive vice-president of the network, who handled this minor chore, felt it was too bad. But it had to be done, he told the newspapers—not to fire her would vitiate the entire loyalty program. No exceptions, said Mr. Ream.

Two weeks later there was an exception. Another employee refused to sign. He too was not a Communist; he too had never belonged to any organizations on the list. His reason for refusing was like Joan Clapp's: CBS had no right to pry into his personal beliefs. Unlike Miss Clapp, this employee was kept on. A letter to him from the same Mr. Ream read, in part: ". . . . to insist upon your signing the questionnaire would be a sterile insistence upon form rather than substance. Accordingly I am happy to tell you . . . that your failure to sign the printed questionnaire is immaterial."

Why did CBS reverse its position? Because this time the employee was not a stenographer who sat below the salt. He was John K. M. McCaffery, master of ceremonies of a program called "We Take Your Word." You've got to be sensible about these things. A stenographer can be picked up easy these days—but a master of ceremonies?

What shocks the Observer deeply is the impetus this mass violation of freedom of opinion gives to the forces of reaction. CBS stated it would keep the results of its questionnaire confidential, but it won't be able to. The ex-FBI agents will come running to pry and search. The House Un-American Activities Committee will get more active. Those who hate because of religion or race will find new victims. CBS, the network which dreamed up the iniquitous "morals" clause, which fired a competent director when she stood on her constitutional rights and refused to answer an improper question, which paid slavish attention to listings in "Red Channels," has now given itself over completely to blacklist.

What can be done about it? There is time—many employees are still holding out, refusing to sign. The Radio Writers' Guild, the Authors' League, and the Radio and Television Directors' Guild are fighting. The American Civil Liberties Union is eager to take up Joan Clapp's defense. Letters of protest have poured in on CBS.

Perhaps CBS may be forced to retract. With what little mind a network has, the one voice it listens to is the voice of public opinion. It may find that the voice of the lunatic fringe is not the true index—that more abhor what CBS is trying to do than approve. Perhaps.

And perhaps John Peter Zenger was fortunate to live when he did. In his day there was no network like CBS.

THE OBSERVER

Looking Backward

DE ARROGANTIA

To the Editor of The Nation:

Sir: In the "United States" volume of Lord Acton's Cambridge Modern History series I observe that one Woodrow Wilson refers to "one John Brown," meaning the Man of Harper's Ferry. Can you tell me who Mr. Wilson may be? From his arguing for state rights in the Confederate sense, and from his palliation of slavery, I conclude that he is a Southerner, and that a pedigree of two centuries of man-stealing, woman-flogging, baby-snatching, and lustful and thrifty miscegenation is the possible pinnacle from which he affects to look down on the historic figure, descended from the Mayflower, whose soul is marching on. Can you give me any reasons for thinking that Mr. Wilson will be remembered, or will deserve to be remembered, as long as John Brown?

A WHITE MAN

[We cannot answer for the future of the President of Princeton University.—ED. NATION]

From the correspondence columns of The Nation *for July 23, 1903.*

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The Case of David Hawkins

BY CAREY McWILLIAMS

Los Angeles, February 27

THE facts of the David Hawkins case may be simply stated. Hawkins has been teaching philosophy at the University of Colorado since 1947. He now has tenure and the rank of full professor. In testimony before the House Committee on Un-American Activities he admitted recently that he had been a member of the Communist Party from 1938 to about 1943. Past membership in the Communist Party was one of the issues in the University of Washington cases; in the Hawkins case the issue is raised in a way that is likely to make the decision a major precedent.

Nowadays most Americans have been led to think that no one ever joined the Communist Party except as an eager conspirator or wilful saboteur. David Hawkins simply believed, for reasons that appeared valid to him, that he should become a Communist. So he sought out the officials of the local branch of the party on the campus of the University of California, where he was a graduate student, and signed up as a member. The intervention of the fascist powers in the Spanish civil war had convinced him of the danger of a second world war; he was revolted by the policies of Chamberlain and Daladier; and he felt that collective sanctions of the type then being urged by the Communist Party might prevent a war. The rest of his testimony on the subject should serve to remind a forgetful nation of the political mood and temper of the 1930's:

> At this particular time [1938], at least in California, there was a kind of feeling of crisis in the air. This was the time of terrific strife in the valleys of California, labor strife, and on the waterfront. There was a general feeling that society was not all in one piece, that people were not participating together in the democratic process but were separating into warring camps; and that may have influenced persons like myself who had sympathies for people coming out of the depression. My wife was a kindergarten teacher and saw real suffering. Children would come to school with nothing to eat or bloated stomachs because they were eating only starch. I think I never had any particular romantic illusions about the Soviet Union. I understood they had decided to follow a path that was going to be very hard on any internal democratic process, but it was true that in this period the Soviet Union, in international affairs, seemed to stand for the things that would seem to lead to peace.

CAREY McWILLIAMS, a staff contributor, is the author of "Witch Hunt: the Revival of Heresy" and other books.

For many people this statement will revive memories of the EPIC campaign of 1934, the San Francisco general strike, and a succession of farm-labor strikes which aroused great excitement at the time. Since then, in most quarters, these events have been discreetly forgotten or the memory of them discredited and defamed. Thus the attack on Hawkins's political testament will have the larger purpose of making those of his generation who were moved by the same experiences feel ashamed of their anti-fascism. The current witch hunt has, in fact, already induced various survivors of the liberal movement of the 1930's to repudiate an important and meaningful phase of their political development.

If many Americans find it incredible that a brilliant graduate student should have joined the Communist Party on his own initiative—the fact that it was then a lawful party has been almost completely forgotten—the process by which he ceased to be a member, as he relates it, seems as unconvincing to those who have chosen to forget the political temper of the period from 1941 to 1945. It was not the Nazi-Russian pact of 1939 so much as the behavior of American Communists at the time of the invasion of Norway and France that first aroused Hawkins's distrust of the party. Once the Nazis had invaded the Soviet Union, these difficulties ceased to be troublesome, for the time being, but Hawkins's feeling about the party was obviously never the same, and over a period of time he simply dropped out of membership.

His prosecutors will contend, of course, that he got out only after he had been offered a position at Los Alamos as Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer's administrative assistant. But the lack of any precisely dated resignation or dramatic denunciation or ideological recantation indicates that affiliation and "disaffiliation" were for Hawkins points in a process and not sudden revelations. The trouble is that the behavior of the "ex-Communist" has become so thoroughly stereotyped that one who does not behave like Budenz is regarded as psychologically improbable. Asked, "What evidence do you have that you actually did resign?" Hawkins could only reply, "No evidence of that sort, and I think no evidence except my life since then." Political realists will agree that there is much less reason to be skeptical about his assertion than about elaborate, self-serving, rhetorical declarations, but the heresy-hunters will not be impressed.

Hawkins testified before the House Committee on un-American Activities on December 20, 1950, but the Denver newspapers first reported his testimony on Janu-

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ary 28, and the entire transcript was not published until February 4. (Mention should be made of the fact that the House Committee carefully emphasized that Hawkins is a brother-in-law of William Sloane, publisher of Max Lowenthal's book on the FBI.) A day or so before the first stories about Hawkins appeared, the University of Colorado celebrated its seventy-fifth anniversary. In the major address of the day Howard Mumford Jones pointed out that "the eighteenth century of Voltaire has yielded to the twentieth century of Senator McCarthy. Ours is an age which is proud of machines that think and suspicious of any man who tries to do so."

IN THE wake of the excitement caused by the release of Hawkins's testimony the regents of the university discovered that since 1921 every teacher "in any private or parochial school or in any academy, college, university, or other institution of learning" in Colorado had been required to take an oath to support and defend the Constitution and "to teach, by precept and example, respect for the flags of the United States and the state of Colorado, reverence for law and order and undivided allegiance to the government of one country, the United States of America." A forgotten by-product of the witch hunt which came after World War I, this statute had been ignored for more than a quarter of a century.

The regents also ordered that an investigation of "possible communistic influence among faculty members" be made by two former FBI agents. Although it is currently assumed that FBI agents are competent to investigate anything from the quantum theory to the politics of Tibet, their use in this case raises the question whether only the methods of a political police were considered adequate for the task. Both investigators, moreover, are now practicing law in Colorado, one in Boulder, the other in Ft. Collins, and thus some doubt may be felt about their ability to rise above local pressures and prejudices. In other state-supported Colorado institutions similar investigations have been undertaken by faculty committees, a procedure which at least preserves the illusion of faculty autonomy.

At the same time the regents directed President Robert L. Stearns to file charges against Hawkins, which will be heard by a six-member faculty committee on privilege and tenure. The charges are (1) past membership in the Communist Party; (2) failure to disclose this fact in applying for a position at the university; (3) the same charge as related to his employment at Los Alamos; (4) "evasiveness" in answering certain questions before the House committee; (5) refusal to answer certain questions; (6) sponsorship of a Marxist Study Group on the campus; and (7) that his eventual separation from the Communist Party was "never clearly defined by formal resignation."

Charges 4, 5, and 6, are not impressive. Sponsorship of the Marxist Study Group—which published a mimeographed paper called the *Pink Buffalo*—did not imply ideological indorsement. Hawkins's testimony was "evasive" only in the sense that he declined, on principle, to name former associates in the Communist Party who had not already admitted membership.

Persons interested in our new-fangled "heresy trials" will be struck by the fact that the scope of the hearing and the nature of the charges were defined long after the commission of the act of heresy. They will note also that the charges emphasize the duty of disclosure rather than the significance of former membership. As a result, conclusions which are essentially political are likely to be based ostensibly on ethical principles. If it is the duty of an applicant for a job to disclose all facts which might be of possible concern to his employer, including acts made meaningful by *future* developments, then the employer seems to be warranted in making specific inquiry about the applicant's political beliefs. It is apparent that the regents would today regard a philosophical belief in communism or non-Stalinist Marxim as tantamount to membership in the Communist Party. And if universities are to insist that applicants for teaching positions disclose political activities and affiliations ranging back over a period of years, the effect will be to punish as more or less "criminal" acts which were perfectly lawful when committed. Albert Guérard states the consequences of such a rule in terms which will seem melodramatic only to those who make a practice of ignoring individual injustices in their passion for conformity: "To take away a man's chance of earning a living is to threaten him with torture and death."

Just how far does this duty of disclosure go? Does it embrace all those political beliefs and activities and organizations which have been denounced by the House Committee on Un-American Activities? It should be noted that Hawkins did not conceal his former membership; he simply failed to disclose a fact concerning which he was never questioned. If he can be discharged for failure to make disclosure of former membership under these circumstances, then the case for loyalty oaths would seem to be conceded. Since the case against Hawkins is not based on specific, stated grounds for dismissal, the "trial" will be long drawn out and will poison the atmosphere of free inquiry at Boulder as surely as the loyalty inquisitions have poisoned the atmosphere at Berkeley and Seattle.

"Outside of science and technology," Howard Mumford Jones told his Boulder audience on January 26, "one is hard put to name a single really great creative idea which has originated in American democracy since the death of William James in 1910. For our creative belief in progress we have substituted the sterile and negative notion of survival." One can only wonder whether Dr. Jones would be invited to repeat this speech today.

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Hungry India

BY JEAN LYON

Madras, February 20

THE food shortage in India is real, abnormal, and frightening. In Madras, which is in one of the worst-hit areas, the city dweller has watched his grain ration dwindle from twenty ounces a day to nine, with only four and a half for his children.

In practically every part of the country the crops have been destroyed by drought or some other calamity. Assam, normally a surplus grain area, had the greatest earthquake in its history, followed by terrific landslides and floods. Uttar Pradesh has had both floods and drought. Bihar has had drought. A tempest in Bombay at the end of the season damaged the rice just as it was being harvested. Locusts ate everything green in Gujerat. Here in Madras State the northeast monsoon, which normally brings rain, has failed for the fourth successive year, and wells and irrigation ponds are drying up.

Hunger can be seen wherever one looks. I was told by an American traveler that only a few hundred miles south of Madras she visited a village where the women were mixing sawdust with their *ragi*, the local millet, in order to give their families enough bulk to stop their hunger pangs. I know a village near here which usually has 250 acres planted in rice; now 200 of these acres are as dry as the dusty road and not a sprig grows in them. The main lake from which irrigation canals used to be fed would make a good baseball field. The fifty remaining acres of paddy are being irrigated from wells which now have between one and three feet of water left in them. Many families in the village are eating grain for one meal a day—on those days when their men are able to pick up odd jobs—and drinking the water in which the grain was boiled for their other meal.

Under normal conditions India has to import between one and a half and two million tons of grain. This year, although figures are not to be trusted, it will probably need four times as much. The ugly truth is that India is on the brink of widespread famine. The worst period will come sometime between now and next fall. Here in South India it will begin in April, when last year's meager harvest has been consumed.

What this means in terms of human lives needs no elaboration. What it means in terms of politics is less certain. If one could say definitely that famine will mean revolution here, and that two million tons of American wheat would prevent a slowly developing democratic India from tobogganing into communism, people at home would act. But one cannot honestly make such a statement. The issue is not that unclouded.

Anger and resentment against the government will increase as hunger spreads. Food riots are likely to occur. Such events will play into the hands of Communist agitators, but according to present indications the Communists will not be able to capture the country or any part of it. Their best leaders are behind bars. Their supporters, it is generally believed, are split into factions and not sufficiently well organized to make a serious attempt at revolution. Nevertheless, the government's position will become shaky under famine conditions. It will be attacked by dissatisfied splinters of the Congress Party as well as by opposition groups.

The 25 per cent cut in grain rations came as a shock to many people. Before that, Food Minister Munshi had lulled the mounting anxiety with his slogans about "self-sufficiency" and "growing more food." India was to become self-sufficient in food by the end of 1952, he said, and nearly so by the end of 1951. Everyone was to grow more food. A one-tenth increase in yield per acre would do the trick. Since the cut was announced, the government has been hotly criticized, in the press and in the coffee shops and around the village wells. It has been accused of mishandling food distribution, of inefficiency, corruption, and lack of foresight. The creeping paralysis which has attacked its long-range agricultural programs—its irrigation projects, and its efforts to improve seeds and fertilizers—is being exposed by amateurs and experts alike. Many ardent Indian nationalists are restlessly calling for action rather than words. Whether famine will bring revolution or not, it is already clear that it may postpone political stability for years.

With respect to Indo-American relations, the question now is how much we can be disliked by the Indian people and still call them friends. From this end it looks as if we had almost reached the limit. Indians have deeply resented the suggestion that their country's vote in the United Nations could be bought with American wheat. Indian national pride may perhaps be over-sensitive, but the arrogance of some loud-spoken Americans has been hard to bear. In any case, if the two million tons of American grain which India requested do not arrive in time to save the lives of at least some of the people threatened with starvation, India's resentment against what it will interpret as American callousness will take a long time to cool.

This does not mean that if the grain is sent, and quickly, America will win India's lasting gratitude. But it will enable us to hold our present position in India's estimation, such as it is. Nor will two million tons of American wheat solve India's chronic food problem and thus insure its stability. It will simply tide the country over the current emergency.

JEAN LYON, a newspaperwoman now living in India, frequently sends The Nation *first-hand reports on conditions there.*

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BOOKS and the ARTS

"Aeneid" for Our Time

THE AENEID OF VIRGIL. A Verse Translation by Rolfe Humphries. Charles Scribner's Sons. $3.50.

VIRGIL'S reputation, like Milton's, has for some time been rather under a cloud. The prevailing opinion regards Catullus, Horace, Propertius as the true Latin poets and Virgil as little more than a skilful rhetorician, capable of some admirable effects but really an academic old bore, "a Tennysonized Homer," as Ezra Pound once called him.

Unjust as, of course, this is, it is perhaps understandable, for we live in an age where the notion of official art has such repugnant connotations that it is difficult for us to believe that a State Bard, which Virgil was, could possibly be any good. In a world where

The best lack all conviction and the worst
Are full of passionate intensity

a poet like Lucretius, who preaches salvation through knowledge, is easier for us to take than a poet like Virgil, who preaches salvation through will-power and whose hero is a man with a political mission.

If, however, we are not completely pessimistic about the human enterprise, if we have any faith that historical decisions are meaningful, that we are not merely the puppets of chance and immediate self-interest, that a just and peaceful world is a possibility, admittedly remote, which it is our duty to try to realize, we owe that faith as much to Virgil as to anyone or anything else.

To imagine a world in which that hope has not yet been born, one has only to go back to Homer and hear, for instance, Achilles speaking to Priam, who has come to beg the body of Hector.

Here, far from home, I sit in Troy,
afflicting you and your children.

Why? For no reason. That is how things are. Does it matter if the Trojans win the war or the Greeks? Not in the least. One can be brave, one can be cowardly, but one can't change anything.

Virgil's conscious imitation of Homer is, of course, not due to a lack of invention; indeed, it is often precisely when he copies most closely that the novelty of his vision is clearest. Odysseus and Aeneas are both wanderers who are driven off their course. But while the goal of Odysseus is fixed by the past—he knows exactly what he wants, to get home—the goal of Aeneas is set by a future of which he is only dimly cognizant. His experiences in Crete and Carthage have a moral as well as an adventure interest; he is not only delayed by forces outside his control but also he delays when he should not. Odysseus has bad luck, Aeneas makes mistakes. Again, Hephaestus fashions a shield for Achilles, so does Vulcan for Aeneas. The figures on the former represent life as it always is, the earth, the besieged city, the dancing floor, the plow, and so on: the figures on the latter portray

the stock to come
The wars, each one in order, all the tale
Of Italy and Roman triumphs. . . .
All this Aeneas
Sees on his mother's gift, the shield of Vulcan,
And, without understanding, is proud and happy
As he lifts to his shoulder all that fortune,
The fame and glory of his children's children.

The "Iliad" is poetry of the highest order, but it is the poetry of barbarians, of a tribal culture; the "Aeneid" is the poetry of civilization, of world history. A child can enjoy Homer; anyone who has come to appreciate Virgil has already grown up.

Mr. Humphries writes that it has become the practice in American schools to read only Books, I, II, IV, and VI. To read snippets of great poems is always bad, but in the case of the "Aeneid" it is fatal. It is possible to read selected passages from the "Iliad" and gain a fairly accurate picture of what is going on, but unless one reads the whole of the "Aeneid" one completely misses the point. In the vast stretch of time which elapses between the moment when Aeneas carries Anchises on his shoulders out of blazing Troy to the moment when the Fury, disguised as a little owl, is beating its wings against the shield of Turuus, everything that happens, happens in a definite order, so that the meaning of any event depends upon what precedes it and what follows it.

The first problem of the verse translator is the choice of an equivalent meter. The length of a line is a matter not only of the number of syllables or accents it contains but also of the number of verbal notions it expresses: thus twelve syllables of an inflected tongue like Latin will often sound shorter than twelve syllables of an uninflected tongue like English. Further, it is impossible to ignore the position occupied by any given meter in the poetic tradition of a given language. The hexameter was the conventional meter in Latin for a long poem; in English, even in the rare cases where successful hexameters have been written, they sound eccentric. The same holds good for other formal questions, such as the choice between rhymed and unrhymed verse. If Gavain Douglas and Dryden chose the rhymed couplet as the metrical form for their translations of the "Aeneid," this was not because they were unaware of the compulsion to alter and pad the original which rhyme would involve but because they felt that in their times and for their readers the rhymed couplet held a position analogous to that held by the hexameter for the Romans and that this fact more than compensated for its drawbacks.

Today, when our ears are accustomed to unrhymed verse and irregular feet, the balance is the other way, and it is unlikely that a contemporary translator would consider using either rhyme or regular iambics.

Indeed, there would seem to be virtually only two sensible choices—either a loose six-beat line as used by Mr. Day Lewis in his translation of the "Georgics":

And now, the time when a vineyard puts
off its reluctant leaves
And a bitter north wind has blown away
the pride of the woodland,
Even now the countryman actively pushes
on the coming
Year and its tasks, attacking the naked
vine with a curved
Pruning-knife he shears and trims it into
shape.

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or a loose blank-verse pentameter such as Mr. Humphries has chosen for the "Aeneid."

They reach the mountain height, the hiding places
Where no trail runs; wild goats from the rocks are started,
Run down ridges; elsewhere, in the open
Deer cross the dusty plain, away from the mountains.

The second problem, which today, in the case of an epic like the "Aeneid," is even harder to solve, is that of style and diction. The epic poem is a solemn rite and written in an elevated liturgical style, but in modern society the sense of ceremony and rite has atrophied—that is why verse epics can no longer be written.

This difficulty had already begun to arise even in Milton's time, so that the elevated style of "Paradise Lost" seems already peculiar and removed from normal sensibility in a way that the Virgilian style does not. Mr. Humphries has decided, very wisely in my opinion, to cut our losses and make no attempt to reproduce the pomp of the epic manner but to concentrate instead on its matter and movement; we do inevitably lose something by this, particularly, I feel, in the speeches, but the loss is infinitely preferable to the pseudo-Miltonic pomposity of some translations.

Nothing is easier than to pick on some particular line and find fault with the translator for his rendering: I would prefer, for instance, a more literal translation of *hoc solum nomen quoniam de coniuge restat* than "I must not call you husband any longer," but a translation must be judged in the large, and, so considered, Mr. Humphries' version is an extraordinarily fine achievement. Further I am amazed, on checking passages here and there, at his skill in detail. Thus, for the famous onomatopoeic lines

libravit dextra media inter cornua caestus,
arduus, effractoque inlisit in ossa cerebro:
sternitur exanimisque tremens procumbit humi bos,

he has

Drew back his right hand, poised it, sent it smashing
Between the horns, shattering the skull, and splashing
Brains on the bones, as the great beast came down, lifeless

and I cannot imagine a happier transliteration of

tum vero exarsit iuveni dolor ossibus ingens,
nec lacrimis caruere genas, segnemque Menoeten,
oblitus decorisque sui sociumque salutis,
in mare praecipitem puppi deturbat ab alta;

than

Then Gyas really was burnt-up; he was crying
In rage; to hell with pride, to hell with safety!
He grabbed that cautious pilot of his, and heaved him
Over the stern.

In making it not only possible but also agreeable for those who cannot read Latin to read straight through the "Aeneid," Mr. Humphries has done this generation and, I hope and believe, several generations to come a service for which no public reward could be too great.

W. H. AUDEN

A Matter of Perspective

NEUROSIS AND HUMAN GROWTH. By Karen Horney. W. W. Norton and Company. $3.75.

KAREN HORNEY'S latest volume of psychoanalytic concepts is in many ways an extension and amplification of her earlier ideas as expressed in "Our Inner Conflicts," published in 1945. Since she emphasizes once again the conception of the idealized image and the inner destructiveness of neurotic perfectionistic goals, it is questionable whether the sophisticated analytic reader will find anything new here. To quote from her introduction, "Under inner stress, however, a person may become alienated from his real self. He will then shift the major part of his energies to the task of molding himself, by a rigid system of inner dictates, with a being of absolute perfection. For nothing short of Godlike perfection can fulfil his idealized image of himself and satisfy his pride in the exalted attributes which (so he feels) he has, could have, or should have."

The author also expands her description of character defenses along the lines of the three patterns of moving toward people, moving against people, and moving away from people. There are many vivid clinical illustrations to illustrate her basic conceptions, and the book as a whole, like all of her other works, carries with it a workmanlike literary quality which makes it very easy reading. From a professional as well as from a social and educational point of view, there is little that can be questioned about her concepts. They reveal a keen clinical mind and a capacity for description which have made her previous works so popular.

The technical reader, however, must raise certain questions. Granting the validity of the ideas, why does she feel the necessity to exclude so much of the larger body of generally accepted psychiatric ideas? This exclusion of so much important psychoanalytic knowledge would be legitimate literary license if Horney did not, at the same time present her own ideas as Psychoanalysis. Her works give the impression to the lay reader that this is psychoanalysis in its entirety, rather than one segment of a much larger system. Why are so few other workers mentioned, many of whom have similar doubts about some of the more debatable aspects of classical psychoanalytic theory? Why does she feel the necessity constantly to exclude and simplify, constantly to challenge or disregard the efficacy of the works of others? Is she so convinced that there is only one relatively simple road to mental health, only one technique of mental therapy which works?

Without challenging the ideas and formulations of Horney, which the body of serious workers are prepared to accept, with minor reservations, one is still startled by the repetitious need of so many authors in psychiatry—and the social sciences in general—to present their works out of perspective or even out of context. Their quarrels with other workers go beyond the scope of "lovers' quarrels" and lead to complete divorce, with all the disastrous consequences and the defensiveness which are inevitable.

The problem of man's relationship to man is much too complex, much too important, to be oversimplified at this stage of our development, sociologically or scientifically. The crystallization of new ideas is now as important as it ever was, but only within the framework of self-discipline and respect for group and historical continuity.

MILTON R. SAPIRSTEIN

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Genius as Windbag

NOTES ON A HORSETHIEF. By William Faulkner. Levee Press.

THOUGH it comes from the one living American who can lay claim to greatness as a novelist, this privately printed and fabulously priced story is a bad piece of writing. Faulkner is cultivating a literary paunch: he has become impossibly garrulous and preposterously oracular. To anyone who admires "The Sound and the Fury," "The Bear," and "The Hamlet" for the superb things they are, it is extremely irritating to see not a decline in Faulkner's powers but something almost worse, a cavalier abuse of them.

In conception "Notes on a Horsethief" is marvelous. An English race horse is brought to America and wins every contest in sight. It is a proud animal, which responds, in "no mere rapport but affinity," only to the word of its groom, a grimy little Englishman. One day the horse is badly hurt in an accident, and the groom, fearful that some meddlesome authorities may have it shot, spirits it away with the help of some Negroes and then nurses it back to life. Though it now has only three legs, the horse can still run faster than any mere four-legged creature, and the groom, together with a stubborn old Negro preacher and his twelve-year-old grandson who doubles as jockey, tours the South and Midwest cleaning up on the races. The horse soon becomes a popular legend and, for the groom and the Negro, an object of passion. When its wealthy owner sends detectives to hunt it out, no one will inform on the horse thieves, and when the old Negro surrenders himself, a mob insists that he be freed. The American public insists on "man's serene and inalienable right to his folly."

Until the full work of which "Notes" is part becomes available, it will be difficult to make out the deeper intentions behind this fable, but it obviously raises memories of Sherwood Anderson's horse stories and is certainly the sort of thing Anderson would have loved. Loved, that is, if Faulkner took the trouble to tell it. As it is, he throws up a thick screen of rhetoric which is forever getting in the way of the story: the "not only . . . but" construction, extremely effective in previous stories, is here greatly overdone, and the writing is strained beyond any need of the fable itself. There are fine bits of observation about Negroes—toward whom, by the way, Faulkner is fundamentally shy—but there is no thematic need for the kind of anguished and magniloquent rhetoric that might be justified in "Intruder in the Dust." Instead of the economy this humorous story obviously demands, Faulkner has allowed himself to ramble along about matters that have little relation to the horse, the groom, or the Negro.

One wonders whether this self-indulgence is partly due to the fact that Faulkner's critics have recently been rolling over and playing delightedly dead each time he publishes something. And one can only hope that when "Notes" appears in final form it will be ruthlessly pared of home-made rant. The talent is still there in all its fabulous luxuriance, and so is the capacity for inventing situations no one else would even dream of; but Faulkner badly needs some ordinary self-discipline. And if his critics, at whatever risk of seeming presumptuous, don't tell him so, who will?

IRVING HOWE

Behind the Gold and Diamond Curtain

TWILIGHT IN SOUTH AFRICA. By Henry Gibbs. Philosophical Library. $4.50.

THE forces of democracy face the direst threat in their existence. So grave is the danger to the free world that it feels compelled to embrace as its allies some of the most undemocratic governments in modern times. Not the least unsavory of these is the Union of South Africa. Now that Smuts is dead, the outside world may expect to receive a truer picture of this "puzzled, frightened country" than it did during his lifetime. Readers of "Twilight in South Africa" will fail, however, to learn the extent to which Smuts helped to bring the Union to the brink of disaster. Indeed, the gentle manner in which Gibbs, an Englishman, treats Smuts will lead some readers to conclude that the author's devastating portrayal of the present plight of the country stems from an animus against the Boers, whose increasingly anti-English policies may lead to their defection from the British Commonwealth. Historians may eventually chart with accuracy Smuts's role in paving the way for the racist policies of Malan. The diplomats of the free world, meanwhile, must be considerably embarrassed by this exposé of the neo-Nazi-fascist policies and practices of one of their most indispensable allies. The unlovely story is based upon a survey made by Gibbs in 1949 that covered 14,000 miles and that included conversations with representatives of the various peoples of the Union. The author deemed it wise to give the assurance that none of the persons he had interviewed were in any way responsible for his conclusions.

To be sure, the equitable adjustment of conflicts resulting almost inevitably from the clash of widely different races, cultures, and religions is no easy task. Nor has the bloody history of the conquest and settlement of the country simplified the problem. For three centuries, but most particularly during the last half of the nineteenth century, Boers, Hottentots, Bushmen, Englishmen, Bantu and Zulus fought for the possession of Cape Colony, Natal, Transvaal, and the Orange Free State. The English emerged the victors after the Anglo-Boer War, 1899-1901, but every Prime Minister since the formation of the Union in 1910 has been a Boer. To war and rapine were added slavery and, about one hundred years ago, the importation of indentured servants from India.

Brotherly love could hardly be compounded from this tale of strife. Some degree of tolerance might none the less have been achieved if South Africa had not possessed a climate suitable for large-scale permanent European settlement and some of the richest gold and diamond mines in the world. The Europeans have taken for themselves so much land that the approximately 15 per cent allocated to the natives, who outnumber them almost four to one, is woefully inadequate to the natives' needs. As a consequence, they have been virtually compelled to work in the mines and as domestic servants in the cities. Despite the enormous wealth of the country these mine workers and domestics receive wages that force most of them to live in slums. The deplorable social conditions are nevertheless at-

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tributed by many white South Africans to traits "inherent in an inferior people."

Hatred, contempt, greed, and fear are by no means confined to the feelings of Europeans for non-Europeans. The Durban riots of two years ago stemmed, at least in part, from the resentment of the natives against discrimination and exploitation by Indians. Most of the 300,000 Indians wish to attain equality with the whites. So do most of the almost one million colored people, some 500,000 of whom had already "escaped" into the ranks of Europeans by 1936. The 8,000,000 natives have little more reason to look for help from Indians and colored people than from the 2,300,000 Europeans.

English South Africans who know the history of Nazi Germany must have concluded by now that the successive repression of natives, colored people, and Indians presages their own doom. Indeed, the most important contribution of Gibbs's book is the revelation—revelation for most Americans—of the neo-Nazi-fascist Broederbond. This organization, which was probably founded during World War I, is pledged to promote the interests of all true Afrikaners, that is, the "loyal" descendants of the Boers defeated in the Anglo-Boer War. Its slogans sound ominously like the *Ein Volk, Ein Reich, Ein Führer* of Nazi Germany. According to the author, Malan and all but one member of his Cabinet are "generally assumed" to be members of the Broederbond, as are some sixty members of the legislature.

Despite the lengthening shadows Gibbs hopes that the "twilight" may mean dawn rather than eventide. This reviewer sees little justification for the hope. If hope there be, it must rest with the voice of real democracy, which condemns with complete impartiality totalitarianism wherever it exists.

RAYFORD W. LOGAN

Our Imperial Past

AMERICA'S COLONIAL EXPERIMENT. By Julius W. Pratt. Prentice-Hall. $6.

CRISIS times find men of science rallied to the defense of their nation's future; too often sustained crises find historians rallying to the defense of their nation's past. So in this volume Professor Pratt defends America's imperial past. He assures us that Americans have no cause to "feel ashamed of their experiment in imperialism"; our intentions were pure and our actions benevolent. This is historical revisionism with a vengeance. And one can hardly rejoice in the thought that the indiscriminately belligerent and sweeping historical judgments of the disillusioned twenties and thirties against American imperial policies are finally to be revised, only to be replaced by equally sweeping defenses of those policies.

The author is not here concerned with the long epic of American expansion into contiguous territory; that expansion had been marked by the admission of new land into the Union with rights equal to those of older states. Rather he is concerned with American overseas expansion, a story not of equals but of ruler and ruled, of colonialism. "Imperialism began," Professor Pratt points out, "when American sovereignty was extended over lands already thickly settled . . . [whose] assimilation into the American state system was impossible or of dubious feasibility."

Plans for overseas expansion had been frequently put before the American public. But not until the late 1890's did most Americans eagerly maintain that their nation's destiny was inextricably bound up in securing, humanizing, sanitizing, Christianizing, and maintaining overseas possessions. Then large navies were needed to protect those possessions, and more bases were needed to service those navies; and so the imperial circle went, ever widening. As in his classic "The Expansionists of 1898," the author explains America's then new willingness—or need—to assert itself imperially in terms, not of economic interests forcing a pliant government's hand, but of intellectual and emotional forces that gripped the whole nation.

Professor Pratt indicates that not until an American empire had been all but realized did most American business men believe that colonial possessions would be economically advantageous. He would also have us believe that not even when popular enthusiasm had pushed America well along the road to empire, and business men were already profiting handsomely from ventures they once had opposed, did economic interests vitally influence imperial plans. In the Caribbean, indeed, where charges of Yankee economic imperialism are most frequently made, these charges are "not sustained by the facts. The dominant motive [for imperialism] was clearly political and strategic rather than economic." To the author it seems that the dollar followed the flag rather than vice versa. This is his guiding assumption and rightly will be challenged by many to whom the converse is more nearly correct.

Colonial administration, Professor Pratt finds, has been primarily concerned —after political and strategic points have well been made—with the well-being of native populations. He does not claim perfection for American colonial policy, yet maintains that it has "aimed steadily at the material and educational advancement of the colonial peoples and the development of their capacity for self-government. American imperialism has, on the whole, been benevolent, and it has been so accepted by those living under it." This last is hardly the case. One thinks at this point of Aguinaldo in the Philippines, of Puerto Rican would-be assassins, of rioting students in Panama, and of many other instances in which natives have considered the American imperium as something less than benevolent. And one wonders if, under pressures of cold wars and hot, and in the guise of "realism," such apologies are to become the new order of the historical day.

Details of the acquisition, step by step, of the American empire are familiar: the colonial bequest of the Spanish-American War, T. R.'s "I took Panama," and the landing of marines in Central American protectorates. Familiar too is the story of America's reversal of policy: the Clark Memorandum, the abrogation of the Platt Amendment, and the development of the Good Neighbor policy. The primary value of this volume lies in its presenting, clearly and in brief compass, the story of the changing governmental and administrative status of different segments of the American empire. Besides, we are provided here with an intelligible survey of American efforts, before, during, and after World War II, to gain security through the establishment and maintenance of military bases abroad. To find this a useful volume one need not agree with the author's final appraisal of American imperialism

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or with his unhappy statement that "only the naive assume that a relationship of ruled and rulers is necessarily and always bad."

RICHARD D. HEFFNER

A Philosophical Critique of Traditional Psychology

THE CONCEPT OF MIND. By Gilbert Ryle. Barnes and Noble. $3.

FIRST-RATE books in philosophy that break fresh ground, are clearly and responsibly argued, and yet are the products of literary skill, are extremely rare. The present work by the Waynfleete Professor of Metaphysical Philosophy in the University of Oxford is such a book. It is one of the most stimulating essays in philosophy published during the past quarter of the century; and it is also one which is wholly free of technical jargon and which can be understood and enjoyed by readers without a professional philosophical training. Mr. Ryle's argument may not carry complete conviction to everyone. But the method of analysis he employs, as well as the substance of his thesis, is bound to leave a mark on the future course of philosophical discussion.

The question to which Mr. Ryle addresses himself is the perennial one of the relation of mind to body. The problem is generated by the customary way of construing the truism that men have both a body and a mind. For it is usually assumed that while bodies are in space, are open to public inspection, and illustrate the laws of physics, minds have no spatial dimensions, though they reside in bodies, are inaccessible to observation by all but their owners, and act in accordance with laws that are peculiar to themselves. On this view, therefore, there is a radical disparity between the inner and the outer, between the mental and the physical; and the overt behaviors of men which are normally characterized by predicates such as "intelligent," "courageous," "moody," and the like are required to be explained in terms of the operation of hidden agents called "minds." Mr. Ryle baptizes this view as the "Ghost in the Machine theory" and attributes it to Descartes—though in point of fact some such view has been in currency at least since classical antiquity. In any case, anyone who adopts it falls heir to a nest of difficult if not insuperable problems. How can two substances, one of which is material while the other is not, interact with one another? How can one know that a mind other than one's own exists—indeed, how can one know that anything but one's own private data of sense exists? How is the apparent universality of law in the domain of physical nature compatible with human freedom? And so on through an interminable series of similar queries that are the stock in trade of philosophical psychology.

It is Mr. Ryle's explicit objective to show that the Ghost in the Machine theory is mistaken, in principle as well as in detail. His positive view is that "when we characterize people by mental predicates, we are not making untestable inferences to any ghostly processes occurring in streams of consciousness which we are debarred from visiting; we are describing the ways in which those people conduct parts of their predominantly public behavior." This alternative to the traditional dualistic conception is obviously not novel. Something like it was part of the teaching of Aristotle; and in more recent years it has long been vigorously championed by behavioristic psychologists, as well as by certain varieties of philosophical naturalism in this country. What is fresh and exciting in Mr. Ryle's book is the method employed for exorcising the Cartesian Ghost. The argument is not built on the methodological maxim, frequently invoked by behaviorists, that only overt behavior can be the subject matter for an objective science of psychology; indeed, behaviorists who justify their program of research on this ground alone are captives of the Ghost in the Machine theory. Nor is the argument based on special biological and anthropological data, upon which some contemporary naturalists are inclined to rely for their conception of mind. Mr. Ryle's argument is much more radical. He wishes to prove that the traditional dualistic theory stems from an unwitting *misuse* of the language ordinarily employed in describing psychological facts. And he attempts to show in searching detail, by contrasting the "ordinary" use of psychological terms such as "knowing," "willing," "feeling," and "sensing" with their use by the Ghost in the Machine theory, that the latter is basically incoherent and unintelligible.

Recent philosophy has been greatly concerned with questions of philosophical grammar, and with proposed criteria for distinguishing between meaningful and meaningless language. An important outcome of this preoccupation is the capital insight that problems may be unresolvable, not because they are too profound for human minds, but because the questions they raise cannot properly be asked—they are only apparent questions, the consequences of employing familiar expressions in strange combinations in violation of the tacit rules that govern their normal use. It is impossible to find an answer to the question, for example, how to spell a *letter* of the alphabet; but it is impossible to supply an answer, not because the question is too difficult, but because it is a profoundly silly one. Words can be spelled, but letters are not the sort of things which have a spelling. It is the method illustrated by this example that is Mr. Ryle's chief method in the present book.

The common pattern of confusion underlying the details of the Ghost in the Machine theory is that of a failure to distinguish between logical types or categories of expressions. This error is sometimes called the fallacy of reification or hypostatization; and though it has many special forms, it consists generally in construing a term that denotes a process, relation, or capacity as if it

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were the name of some substantial thing or object. Suppose, for example, that Smith invites to his home his foreign friend Forgeron, so that the latter may see for himself what family life is like in America. But suppose that after enjoying Smith's hospitality for some time Forgeron were to complain that though he met Smith's wife and children, had meals in common with them, took part in their recreations, and so on, he had never been introduced to Smith's Family Life. It is clear in this case just what is the nature of Forgeron's error: he mistakenly assumes that "Family Life" is the name of some supra-sensible "entity," distinct from the complex activities in which Smith and the members of his family are normally engaged. But Forgeron would be guilty of a similar confusion if, after listening to Smith's table and shop talk, playing bridge or checkers with him, reading his satirical verses, and the like, he were to announce that he knows nothing of Smith's mind, and that in fact Smith's mind is forever incapable of being known to anyone but Smith. In this case also Forgeron errs in taking the word "mind" to refer to some substantial but mysterious object, over and above the manifest behaviors in which Smith's body is involved.

The power and fascination of Mr. Ryle's book derive from the remarkable virtuosity with which he contrasts the normal use of psychological predicates as descriptions of modes of behavior, and their dubious use as names for secret agents inhabiting the human body. But no review as brief as the present one can possibly convey his extraordinary sensitivity to the nuances of meaning carried by familiar psychological words, and the reader can only be urged to turn to the book for the illumination it throws on a large variety of special questions. However, particular mention must be made of the discussion of sensation and observation. There is an influential tradition in modern philosophy, vigorously championed by Bertrand Russell and other recent writers, according to which the termini of direct observation are inherently subjective "sensations" or "sense-data." On the basis of this assumption it is then argued that there really are two radically incompatible worlds —the world of objects encountered in familiar experience, and the mysterious world of strange particles discovered by physics. Indeed, Russell has not hesitated to conclude that common-sense beliefs, such as that grass is green or that stones are hard, must be judged as false on the evidence supplied by physics. The dislocation which such a view effects in our ordinary conceptions of things is tremendous, and human life is converted by it into a tissue of paradox. But the whole argument rests on the fundamental assumption concerning the privacy and subjectivity of sense-data, and it is this assumption which falls victim to Mr. Ryle's critical method. Although the general line of his analysis is familiar, his trenchant formulation of the difficulties in the sense-data theory should give serious pause to those who have been accepting it on the word of Russell.

In Mr. Ryle's judicious hands, the method of linguistic analysis is a powerful and illuminating tool. Nevertheless, as in the case of other sharp-edged instruments, there is always a danger that it may cut away healthy as well as diseased tissues, and that in less skilled hands it may inflict irreparable damage. There is room here for indicating only in a general way the grounds for this fear. Mr. Ryle's method consists in setting up the "ordinary usage" of expressions as the standard in terms of which various suspected usages are evaluated. However, it is doubtful whether ordinary usage is uniformly definite, and it is sometimes evident that what is declared to be standard usage is simply the linguistic habits of a parochial group. Moreover, the construction of theories in many of the advanced sciences often proceeds by altering the "ordinary" sense of words, so that in their emended use they refer to hypothetical objects —such as electrons or genes—which are not *literally* encountered in human experience. There is nothing sacrosanct about ordinary language, and it would be a first-class blunder to disallow various expressions that occur in a theory simply because they are employed in ways strange to common sense. Indeed, there is no a priori reason for rejecting the Ghost in the Machine theory, and if it is to be rejected it must be on the usual grounds that a theory is rejected in the sciences as no longer serviceable. Mr. Ryle admits as much when he notes that the phlogiston theory now has no utility, although at one time it was a legitimate system of explanation for the facts of combustion; and he grants a great deal when he acknowledges that the two-world theory of mind and matter, though now recognized to be a myth, may have played an invaluable role in the historical development of psychology. "Myths are not always detrimental to the progress of theories," he declares. But whether a theory is just a myth cannot be settled exclusively in terms of linguistic analysis. That powerful and illuminating method of philosophizing must not be employed—and Mr. Ryle is rarely tempted so to employ it—to dismiss as nonsensical any theoretical construction which happens to contravene some assumed rules of ordinary linguistic usage.

ERNEST NAGEL

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The New World

JOURNEY TO THE DAWN. By Charles Angoff. The Beechhurst Press. $3.75.

THIS book is the first volume in a projected trilogy on the life and trials of a Jewish immigrant family from czarist Russia. God-fearing, hard-working, and poor, the Polonskys reflect in their life and thought the prevailing religious and intellectual currents of their place and time: "One was Orthodox Jewish, deeply religious, and the other was Zionist-Revolutionary."

Firmly rooted for generations in the Russian soil, the Polonskys are impelled, by persecution and need at the close of the nineteenth century, to seek spiritual and physical security in another land. In

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their troubled days and nights the dream of America looms bright, and like millions of others they one day find a home in the new world. The saga of the family is in its bone and marrow the story of America, and it is a story worth telling. Their daily experiences—fulfilment and disappointment, amazement and wonder—after they emigrate to Boston are perceived through the eyes of the sensitive and introspective David, who is brought to America at the age of seven.

The book suffers from occasional over-writing, and some of its major characters seem insubstantial. But when the author focuses on David, the narrative becomes pure fiction, and the wavering between novel and chronicle ceases. "Journey to the Dawn" is, however, a genuinely Jewish novel, and not simply because it treats a Jewish theme. Unlike most American Jews writing in English, Angoff has experienced this life from the inside and accepts it without reservation. Though written in English, the book is in the genre of the Yiddish *roman*; its spirit of reverence, its deeply felt empathy, compassion, and understanding are in the classic tradition of Yiddish literature, of which Angoff reveals a thorough and intimate knowledge.

If the next two volumes maintain the creative level of the present novel after it picks up David's story, this work may prove to be one of the few significant portrayals in American literature of authentic Jewish life.

ELIEZER GREENBERG

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Books in Brief

DRAGONS IN AMBER. Further Adventures of a Romantic Naturalist. By Willy Ley. Viking. $3.75. Mr. Ley is a German-trained paleontologist with an unusual gift for popularization on a high level. The first section of the present volume deals with the long history of amber, which was valued for thousands of years before men understood what it was or even where it came from; the remaining sections describe various mysteries or oddities among certain plants and animals which are either extinct or, like the now common ginkgo tree, ought to be. Mr. Ley is no mere entertainer with wonders. He presupposes genuine interest on the part of his public and a willingness to read with some attention stories that are often rather complicated. But he is a skilful, instructive guide among the byways of science, and this book is recommended to those who enjoyed either his similar "The Lungfish, the Dodo, and the Unicorn" or "The Conquest of Space," which used the same method in connection with a different subject matter. Mr. Ley quotes Martial's poem on the insect preserved in amber. Perhaps he did not remember Pope's on the same subject: "The things we know are neither rich nor rare/But wonder how the devil they got there."

GREEK POETRY FOR EVERYMAN. Chosen and Translated by F. L. Lucas, Macmillan. $3.50. This title takes in a lot of population, if not territory. The scope of the anthology is wide, including generous portions of Homer and minute fragments of such obscure authors as Praxilla of Sicyon, or Addaeus of Macedonia, all the way down to Joannes Barbucallus, mid-sixth century, A. D. Professor Lucas's various introductions, commentaries, and notes are informative and delightful, even when he is being a little unjust. Unhappily, the actual text is the least readable portion of the book, partly because the publishers have used a small type and crowded too much material in a dull-looking page, partly also because, for all his good intentions, the translator's language becomes a little monotonous and his manner seems at times a bit too literary.

Films

MANNY FARBER

HOLLYWOOD, which once poured hope and happiness into studio-built stories about poor devils in tenements, now sends its crews to mingle in common life and embroider it with more troubles than a psychiatrist hears about in a month.

"Teresa," a rather warm love story about a war bride (Angeli) orienting herself in a new country, busily poses more problems than its tyro scenarist (Stern) and speedy director (Zinnemann) can cope with. The two-part script details the war experiences of a panicky G. I. as he quickly woos and wins a pretty Italian, a sparrow version of Ingrid Bergman, and cracks up on his first combat patrol. Back home, in an East Side tenement, a dominating mom tries to maladjust the marriage, and the ex-G. I. runs away from so many things—jobs, picnics, rehabilitation clinics—that he literally suggests a heavy-gaited fullback getting into condition on New York sidewalks. This rather simple story of a son snarled in his mother's apron strings and a smart girl-wife trying to untangle him is hopelessly complicated by a writer who seems to know about every uncomfortable thing that is bothering mankind, and spells it out in neon lights. Fortunately the mishmash has some refreshing talent working for it in the way of uninhibited non-actors and a poetic director; so the result is as perversely enjoyable as a Third Avenue El excursion with stops in derelict rooms and sauerkraut-odored hallways to show you what terrifies the average New York visitor.

Sometimes the director forgoes his documentary tricks to assist the writer in squeezing a morbid fact until it shrieks. The opening scene in a state unemployment office tingles with the bald accuracy of unhurried, depressed faces, a stark gymnasium-like room, an incredibly mean-faced clerk pounding out questions to the roar of a drum beat—and the conscious lining up of clients like a neatly spaced chain-gang takes all the dejected straggle out of the scene. When the cavernous-eyed

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hero bolts in fear from his line and start hoofing through a jittery Bowery, caught wonderfully by a hidden camera, a mysterious narrator pops into the picture for a single deathless announcement: "His occupation is—running away!" Just in case this hasn't been nailed home, the hero keeps running into and out of various places. In a mental clinic his neurosis is glibly tied with a Freudian knot: "My father, he's nowhere, that guy. He never made me feel safe." This over-explaining is less objectionable than the clutter these fractional scenes contribute to a script that gets lost in an unending flashback.

However, no M-G-M crew in years has been so inventive in making nonactors behave naturally as they flounder about in existence. Much of the film's intricacy and intimacy comes from Angeli, who is given mannerisms and speech so cloying that she is literally forced into cunning impetuousness to bring them off. Ericson gets as close to the oafish insecurity of a perennial adolescent as a movie lead ever managed, partly as a result of the trying situations Zinnemann arranges in order to play on his very lack of acting experience. Out of this extended hodgepodge Zinnemann gets the traumatic accidents he wants, and a brutal study of that pet New York game of harassing the unsophisticated underdog.

The Italian sequence in Scasoli, a town in the Apennines that M-G-M redestroyed to film its war-torn look, shows the handiwork of some G. I. advisers and two new explosive personalities, Bill Mauldin and Ralph Meeker; the soldiers are good realistic versions of the Mauldin cartoons. There is also the kind of fight between G. I.'s, with its tiny heartbreaking evidences of cowardice and surprising accidents, that hairy-chested directors like Huston have been mismanaging for years. On the other hand, the makers of this film might well have studied Huston's superior "San Pietro" before they got around to pretentiously sentimentalizing war waifs, printing a war scene on glossy stock, and using a fearless camera man cool enough to make a poetic study of a sparkling stream in midbattle.

Other new releases include "The Magnet," which will draw inaudible chuckles from people who never tire of psychiatrist jokes and invented childish antics. Save for some exciting, unpredictable, gravel-voiced slum kids, the British actors are as easily read as the carefully wrought production, which makes skilful use of editing and photography in the questionable project of kidding a ten-year-old's conscience.

"I'd Climb the Highest Mountain" missed the path when script-writer Trotti decided to exploit the folksy charm of a young backwoods preacher. Susan Hayward's robins'-nest coiffeur, not quite realistic impressions of deep country mustaches, attractive children, and red-clay roads may make the picture worth seeing—on a double bill in the 50-to-85-cent price range.

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Music

B. H. HAGGIN

I WILL conduct until I am ninety!" Toscanini declared a couple of years ago; and his performances have provided not the slightest reason for doubt that he would. It is a bitter thought that a mere injury to his knee has stopped his activity at a point when, by the evidence of what one has heard, there isn't a first sign of any impairment of his phenomenal powers or even of the physical stamina involved in his conducting; when, moreover, the N. B. C. Symphony, after thirteen years, has changed from an aggregation of virtuoso players to a unified and marvelously beautiful instrument of virtuoso caliber; and also when at last, after thirteen years, the broadcasts have been moved to Carnegie Hall where the performances have had the tonal beauty they did not have in Studio 8H.

One had a demonstration of Koussevitzky's continuing powers under favorable conditions, at the first Carnegie Hall concert of the Israel Philharmonic. The favorable conditions were that he was conducting two of his favorite pieces—Prokofiev's Fifth Symphony and Tchaikovsky's Fourth—which he had played with the orchestra a number of times, and that he and the orchestra were therefore operating with relaxed assurance. The result was playing which had the refinement of execution and sonority characteristic of Koussevitzky performances, and which, in the process of demonstrating his continuing powers, also demonstrated what the orchestra was like and what it could do under a virtuoso conductor's direction: the fact that it had excellent strings which could produce tone with the silky sheen Koussevitzky aims for, that it had good woodwinds, and that even its undistinguished brass section could be got to play with discretion if not with beauty of tone.

The next night Leonard Bernstein conducted the orchestra in Mozart's "Linz" Symphony with a warmth of feeling for the music and a distinguished taste in its treatment that Koussevitzky knows nothing about; but the beauty Koussevitzky had created was gone from the string tone, and raucous sounds from the brass were heard in the coarse-toned performances of Chavez's Sinfonia India, which Bernstein played very well, and Schumann's Second Symphony, which he played with an excess of emotion and an insufficiency of taste. Assuming adequate preparation in rehearsal and previous performance one can only surmise that there was not the relaxed situation of the night before. And recalling the dry sound of the Philadelphia Orchestra strings when Bernstein conducted it a year ago, as well as a reliable report of the coarse sound of the Boston Symphony in a performance of the Schubert C major that he conducted, one wonders whether that relaxed situation is something he is unable to create with any orchestra.

In his review of the first concert Virgil Thomson questioned, rightly, the bringing of the Israel Philharmonic to America merely for two of our own conductors to play their familiar repertory; had Israel no confidence in its own conductors or its own music? And what struck me was that at concerts ostensi-

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bly presenting the Israel Philharmonic the programs not only had photographs of Koussevitzky and Bernstein on the outside, but did not even give the names of the orchestra's members inside.

What little I was able to hear of Cantelli's broadcasts with the N. B. C. Symphony confirmed previous impressions of his outstanding gifts as musician and conductor. One of the programs offered a work by Dallapiccola which used material in a number of contemporary and older idioms and techniques in a way that was very impressive at first hearing. Also worth noting is the fact that in one broadcast the Haydn Symphony No. 93 and in another the Musorgsky-Ravel "Pictures at an Exhibition" were cut off a few seconds before the end—it being unthinkable, in the American way of broadcasting great music, that the commercial announcement be cut by a few seconds instead. Perhaps the American way in this matter would be changed if enough listeners promised to boycott the product advertised in the commercial announcement.

While I am on the subject of the American way of broadcasting music let me add one further comment on John Crosby's reference to the golden age when, with the Philharmonic at 3 and the N. B. C. Symphony at 5, "symphony music on Sunday became an American tradition." Few music lovers would want to listen to two symphony concerts in succession in Carnegie Hall on a Sunday afternoon, or to five symphony concerts—in addition to an opera—in two days; most of them attend concerts on weekday nights as well as weekends and would distribute that number of events through the week. It was not an American but strictly a broadcasting tradition that gave them the two broadcasts of the Philharmonic and N. B. C. Symphony in succession on Sunday afternoon, and jammed as many as five orchestras with the Metropolitan Opera into the weekend, but allowed nothing to be heard on commercially more valuable weekday evenings except a couple of half-hour programs at 11:30—an even more "terrible hour for a symphony program" than 10. (In 1946 A. B. C. moved the Boston Symphony from Saturday to Tuesday evening; but in that year N. B. C. added Orchestras of the Nation to the Saturday bedlam.)

LETTERS TO THE EDITORS

Passport Denial Protested

Dear Sirs: After six months the State Department has finally denied a passport to Adam Lapin, associate editor of the *People's World*, whom the paper wanted to send abroad as its foreign correspondent.

Lapin applied for a passport to cover news developments in Europe and Asia for the *People's World* last August 15. Instead of a yes or no answer, we received vague assurances that the case was under "active consideration." When the *People's World* issued a public statement protesting the long delay as tantamount to a rejection, the State Department finally acted, stating it was denying passports to Lapin and to Joseph North of the *Daily Worker* in the "spirit" of the McCarran act.

The spirit of the McCarran act is, of course, far-reaching. But the State Department has gone beyond the letter of the law. A recent Justice Department brief filed in federal court in Washington, D. C., states explicitly: "Even the provisions denying individual members of Communist organizations passports . . . are contingent upon entry of a final order of registration." Lapin is not associated with any institution or organization that has been subjected to "a final order of registration." There is therefore not even the shred of a legal reason for denying him a passport.

In any case, the State Department's action is a flagrant denial of freedom of the press. It would set a most dangerous precedent if the State Department were permitted to deny passports to newspapermen on the basis of its own whims or prejudices.

AL RICHMOND,
Executive Editor, *People's World*
San Francisco, February 27

Wanted: Constructive Liberalism

Dear Sirs: The greatest disappointment of these terrible times is the failure of "liberals" to provide constructive leadership. America's mobilization at the expense of domestic reform and foreign aid is leading us to the outbreak of atomic war and is depriving us of our only weapons against totalitarian-directed social changes. The current preparations for war make a mock of any liberal program for human welfare.

American liberals have taken the view that although they don't quite agree with our official foreign policy, the Russians had better be stopped. And so they support the war policy of the Administration. This is the kind of liberalism that has given the leadership of social-reform movements all over the world to the Communists.

The United States is trying to stop Communist aggression the same way Hitler attempted to stop it; the results will be the same for us as they were for the German people. We can already see our civil liberties disappear. Without them we will be left only with a choice between capitalist totalitarianism and socialist totalitarianism.

Since the death of President Roosevelt, the Democratic Party has ceased to be an agency for social reform. The best hope for a free America and continued social progress along democratic lines is the establishment of a Liberal Party. This might have been accomplished through the Progressive Party of Henry Wallace if that movement had not been abandoned to Communists and fellow-travelers. We must have some such movement, however, to rally those people who realize the impossibility of stopping Russia with short-sighted policies and see the need, not for appeasement, but for compromise.

RODERICK E. MACIVER
Sausalito, Cal., February 26

"Just Sound the Call!"

Dear Sirs: Is not now an opportune time to start making plans for a third political force in this country, perhaps a third party? How long are liberals willing to be clubbed over the head by their supposed friends? When will organized labor learn that it cannot hope even for listeners in an Administration that is being increasingly taken over by Southern reaction, big-city political bosses, and special-favor interests? When will liberals begin to think of themselves as a political "threat" in this country and not as a misunderstood minority?

There are surely some leaders in this country with vision enough to produce a policy—all formulations can be found fortunately in your journal—which will insure justice at home and the support of liberal forces all over the world. There should be no brayings about the crime of supporting Franco

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Spain from people calling for arms and men for Europe. To believe that Franco's miserable "army" can fight communism is no more stupid than to believe that sending arms to Europe or having Europe send its sons again into war will stop communism.

The world is literally begging for a program that will bring lasting peace, and this country offers nothing better than armaments and meaningless slogans. Is not the lack of an adequate program a reflection on liberal leaders? Just sound the call and you will be surprised how many would flock to the banner!

PHILIP SIEKEVITZ

Brookline, Mass., February 25

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PERSONAL

1984? Horrified at prospect of developing new weapons for spreading undemocracy. Mechanical computing 'brain'? No! Prefer to think with my own. Young mathematician. Wide interests. Human being. Box 213, c/o The Nation.

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For Organized Non-Violence

Dear Sirs: During the past few years I have become converted to the Gandhi idea of organized non-violence which relies on the appeal to the conscience and basic humanity of all men. I have become convinced that in no country does the average man desire war and that the Gandhi idea is the only permanent solution of international antagonisms.

When Korea was invaded, I vacillated in my belief, thinking that here was a legitimate instance where force should be opposed with force. But as everyone can now see, that method has led to a tragic impasse. There can be only one outcome: the tragic destruction of Korea and its people. Nothing but laborious reconstruction in an atmosphere of suspicion and recrimination awaits both sides.

In this country it is only too apparent that our dependence on military strength for "security" is gradually constricting our democratic way of life. We are relinquishing our civil liberties reluctantly under the illusion that this is necessary to preserve them. We are drifting into a planned economy, planned not for production for the welfare of all but for defense production controlled by a minority.

Aside from the religious and moral arguments for the philosophy of non-violence, it seems to me it has several indisputable advantages as an approach to world affairs. It immediately clears the air of desperate attempts to fix the blame on someone else. Freedom of opinion and expression can be maintained without the need for repression or censorship. And it avoids the selection of all able-bodied and mentally fit young people for extinction, leaving the preservation of the species to the survivors.

I can see that there is little hope of such ideas being adopted in this country, but I feel that there is only one alternative to organized non-violence—eventual organized violence.

SHELDON HARNICK

New York, February 22

Thomas Paine Memorial

Dear Sirs: The town of Thetford, Norfolk, England, gave America one of its greatest citizens, Thomas Paine. Paine has been described as the Friend of Mankind and America's Godfather, and many of your Presidents have paid tribute to the part he played in the founding of your country.

As part of the Festival of Britain, the Borough of Thetford will celebrate Thomas Paine's connection with this ancient town during the first week of June, 1951. There will be a performance of a play about him, the recitation of some of his works by famous American and British film stars, and the founding of a permanent Thomas Paine Museum and Library.

I would be most grateful for the loan of any relics, letters, or portraits of Thomas Paine for the month of June, and the gift of any books or prints which admirers of Paine could send us. We would insure and take care of all objects of value. Contributions may be sent to me at The Gables, Thetford, Norfolk, England.

Naturally, we welcome all American visitors to Paine's birthplace, which still stands and which is marked by a plaque erected by American soldiers stationed near Thetford during the last war.

MRS. E. WATLING, Mayor

Thetford, England, February 21

Evidence Wanted

Dear Sirs: The Southern Conference Educational Fund is collecting data concerning hospital discrimination, especially in cases where refusal to admit a Negro has been followed by the death of the patient. We should be grateful to your readers for names, dates, and possible sources of further information. Our address is 822 Perdido Street, New Orleans 12, Louisiana.

JAMES A. DOMBROWSKI

New Orleans, La., February 15

Costly Trial

Dear Sirs: I am scheduled to stand trial in the Federal District Court in Washington, D. C., on March 7, on the charge of "contempt of Congress." None of the established organizations which deal with such matters have seen fit to offer me any support in this case. As I have neither money nor organizational backing. I am acting as my own lawyer. Even so, the expense of conducting the defense is considerable and far beyond my means. The problem will become even more serious if the case has to be carried to the higher courts.

I have therefore decided to appeal to progressives for financial help, asking them to make contributions to my defense according to their ability. In return I will send to each contributor a copy of the record of the trial. My address is 7 Highland Place, Yonkers, N. Y.

EARL BROWDER

Yonkers, N. Y., March 3

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Crossword Puzzle No. 403

BY FRANK W. LEWIS



ACROSS

1 Both suitable and seasonable material! (6-3-4)
9 and 10 Eighteen down around the dial. (5-5-4)
11 Leavenworth's no good, yet makes things swell. (7)
12 The rowdy is covering Abner's friend. (7)
13. What's wrong with a lesion? It might be disturbing! (5)
14 It's rough when you get this on your chest. (4-5)
16 Cessation of the boatmen. (9)
18 A cab always carries one. (5)
19 Man gave this animal its name. (4, 3)
21 Hair isn't short, by a long ways! (7)
22 No market for the fuel importer! (9)
23 An island that sounds like those of the Pacific. (5)
24 A peculiar person suits it, and they might suit peculiar persons! (13)

DOWN

1 Its concrete results are not limited to the Northwest. (8, 6)
2 He chiseled from Shaw. (9)
3 Fanatical. (7)
4 Save a service, perhaps. (5)
5 Little Red wagons. (9)
6 Their voices carry more than a broken sword. (7)
7 A train might, and follow the track. (5)
8 Their examinations are usually superficial. (14)
14 One who proverbially gets lost. (9)
15 It takes a complicated situation to make the oil go up but not to the exact brim. (9)
17 Buckle up? (7)
18 See 9.
20 Went wrong, despite ultimate direction. (5)
21 Fast ships. (5)

• • • • •

SOLUTION TO PUZZLE No. 403

ACROSS:—1 CITY SLICKER; 9, 21, and 23 THE GREAT WALL OF CHINA; 10 MILLET; 11 ISLANDS; 12 BUNTING; 14 PRUNED; 15 OVERTONE; 17 CANDY BAR; 20 STRAWS; 22 MISCALL; 24 PATELLA; 26 GEMINI; 27 DURATION; 28 CABINET WORK.

DOWN:—2 INGRAINED; 3 YIELDED; 4 LOTS; 5 COMMUTE; 6 ECLAT; 7 CHASER; 8 VERNON; 13 SORRY; 16 TORMENTOR; 18 ABIDES; 19 BELLINI; 20 SPARROW; 25 IDLE.

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